Wyoming Statute and the Open-Door Doctrine Allow for the Disclosure of Incriminating Information during Psychiatric Expert Witness Testimony under Narrow Conditions
In Adams v. State, 534 P.3d 469 (Wyo. 2023), the Supreme Court of Wyoming evaluated an appeal by Jett Garriott Adams, who alleged that his conviction for multiple charges, including attempted murder, was unfair because of prosecutorial misconduct. Mr. Adams’ appeal specifically identified expert witness testimony provided by two psychologists as prejudicial. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling and found that the expert witnesses’ testimony was not prejudicial and was protected by the open-door doctrine and Wyoming statute.
Facts of the Case
Mr. Adams was charged in Wyoming with ten offenses that stemmed from a high-speed chase and a shootout with a law enforcement officer. Mr. Adams’ journey began in Missouri, where he committed a probation violation for a felony conviction after missing a probation revocation hearing. With the understanding that he was bound for prison, Mr. Adams purchased a firearm, planned to purchase more, and conspired to shoot court and law enforcement personnel to avoid prison. But he ultimately chose to cut off his GPS monitor and depart Missouri with a plan to relocate anonymously in Idaho.
In Wyoming, Mr. Adams was stopped by an officer for a traffic stop, which led to a short high-speed chase that concluded with the exchange of gunfire. After this firefight, Mr. Adams again sped away. Several law enforcement officers gave pursuit, and Mr. Adams fired repeatedly at the officers while driving. Mr. Adams eventually pulled off the road and fled on foot. Officers arrested Mr. Adams and he was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault and battery, felony interference with a peace officer, felony property destruction, aggravated fleeing a police officer, use of a firearm while committing a felony, reckless driving, reckless endangerment, and speeding.
Mr. Adams was found competent to stand trial by psychologist Paul Murdock, PsyD. Mr. Adams requested a bench trial and pleaded not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency (NGMI), defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305 (1985). Renee Wilkinson, PhD, conducted an NGMI evaluation and diagnosed Mr. Adams with depression, anxiety, and borderline personality disorder. Dr. Wilkinson opined that Mr. Adams appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct and could conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Mr. Adams’ counsel requested that the Public Defender’s office pay for a second evaluation, which was denied. Mr. Adams then wrote a pro se letter to the court requesting assistance in obtaining a second NGMI evaluation, to no avail.
At trial, the state called Dr. Wilkinson as a witness, and she gave biographical information about Mr. Adams, including his background and psychiatric history. She opined that Mr. Adams did not meet criteria for an NGMI defense. Later, Mr. Adams testified for several hours in his own defense. The state then called Dr. Murdock as a rebuttal witness, and he was cross-examined by the defense. During cross examination, the defense asked Dr. Murdock to testify regarding his diagnosis of Mr. Adams with posttraumatic stress disorder, and about Mr. Adams’ mental state at the time of the offense. This testimony was followed by a limited redirect examination by the state. During this redirect examination, the prosecution asked a series of yes and no questions regarding Mr. Adams’ mental state at the time of the offense, during which Dr. Murdock spontaneously testified as to Mr. Adams’ stated intent to shoot a law enforcement officer.
The three-day trial ended with Judge Dawnessa Snyder finding Mr. Adams guilty on nine counts, including attempted murder and aggravated assault and battery. Judge Snyder sentenced Mr. Adams to life without parole and consecutive sentences of various lengths. Mr. Adams appealed the ruling, stating that testimony by his mental health evaluators was inadmissible evidence based on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (2023) and § 7-11-304 (2009), on the grounds that they provided incriminating testimony. Further, Mr. Adams’ appeal included concern that prosecutors committed prosecutorial misconduct in their use of inadmissible evidence by asking legally objectional questions. Because Mr. Adams did not object to prosecutorial questioning of either evaluator during the trial, upon his appeal the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case for misconduct.
Ruling and Reasoning
The court summarized the concern of the appeal as whether the state of Wyoming committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing statements and information obtained during Mr. Adams’ mental health evaluations. The court ruled that the prosecutor did not knowingly use inadmissible evidence or ask objectional questions, and that Mr. Adams suffered no prejudice because of their testimony. The court ruled that, in absence of knowingly providing inadmissible evidence, and in absence of testimony negatively affecting Mr. Adams, the threshold of prosecutorial misconduct was not crossed. In this ruling, the court did not decide if a rule of law was clearly and unequivocally violated.
This decision marked the first time that the Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-21-303 (2023), which addressed how information from mental health evaluations can be used in evidence. First, for alleged prosecutorial misconduct to be found, the defendant must show that the record is clear that an alleged incident was a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and that this violation led to the denial of a substantial right, causing a material prejudice. Further, prosecutorial misconduct requires that the violation must have been an action that the prosecutor knew, or should have known, would compromise the fairness of the trial. The court acknowledged the importance of this determination, considering the state called both Dr. Wilkinson and Dr. Murdock as witnesses.
The court ruled that that the state did not knowingly attempt to get inadmissible testimony from expert witnesses. Dr. Murdock, for example, spontaneously volunteered information during his testimony, and the court found no evidence that the prosecution anticipated or prompted Dr. Murdock’s answer, nor did the prosecution rely on this information for their case. During cross examination, the defense counsel questioned Dr. Murdock about Mr. Adams’ psychiatric symptoms and mental status at the time of the offense, “opening the door” for discussion of this subject matter. Though the court acknowledged the importance of the well-established rule of limiting testimony by psychiatric examiners, “A defendant’s statements offered as a basis for an expert’s opinion on the issue of his mental condition—whether sanity, competency, or other mental illness or deficiency—are admissible and fall within the limitation prescribed by Federal Rule of Evidence 12.2c” (Adams, p 476, citing U.S. v. Madrid, 673, F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982), p 1120-121). The court also cited Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987), which further established the admissibility of evidence obtained during competency evaluations in cases where a defendant raises the subject of mental state at the time of offense.
The court reasoned that Dr. Murdock’s and Dr. Wilkinson’s testimony was not prejudicial, and Mr. Adams’s own testimony was crucial to this facet of the opinion. Mr. Adams accused prosecutorial misconduct concerning Dr. Wilkinson’s discussion of Mr. Adams’ childhood; however, Mr. Adams offered more extensive and detailed testimony on this subject. Mr. Adams also had a problem with Dr. Murdock’s discussion of his intention while firing at police, but the court noted that Mr. Adams offered more detail about his intention to harm or kill the law enforcement officer than did Dr. Murdock.
Discussion
The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that, in this case, select incriminating testimony by expert witnesses superficially appeared to violate §§ 7-11-303 and -304, which define what information obtained by mental health examiners is admissible in court. But, in ruling that the expert testimony was admissible, the court cited multiple extenuating circumstances of its decision. One expert witness spontaneously volunteered an incriminating statement after Mr. Adams’ counsel “opened the door” to this subject matter, making his testimony fair evidence. A second expert witness offered background information about Mr. Adams, but the court found that Mr. Adams’ own extensive and self-incriminating testimony nullified any prejudicial value of the expert witnesses’ testimony. Because the court found that the state did not knowingly apply inadmissible evidence, nor was the allegedly inadmissible evidence prejudicial against Mr. Adams, there was no prosecutorial misconduct.
As discussed in the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, eliciting a defendant’s account of events surrounding an alleged offense may be valuable when determining the defendant’s competence to stand trial (Mossman, D, et al. AAPL practice guideline for the forensic psychiatric evaluation of competence to stand trial. J Am Acad Psychiatry Law 2007 Dec; 35(4):S3-S72, p S35). Adams illustrates that, depending on jurisdiction, a real risk exists that incriminating information becomes part of testimony. An understanding of open-door doctrine should guide a nuanced notification of the nonconfidential nature of the forensic interview.
- © 2024 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law