Competency to Stand Trial following a Suicide Attempt

Facts of the Case

Scott Flow was charged with rape, burglary, kidnapping, sexual offense, possession of a firearm by a felon, and violation of a protection order for events that took place in Dallas, North Carolina between May 26 and May 27, 2018. Trial proceedings began on December 9, 2019. Two colloquies were conducted by the trial judge with the defendant on December 13 and December 16, 2019 to determine whether the defendant was freely and intelligently making the decision to not testify or present other evidence in his defense. After the second colloquy, the jury heard closing arguments from both sides. The trial proceedings were then concluded for the day.

On the morning of December 17, 2019, Mr. Flow jumped from a mezzanine level within the jail. He sustained injuries to his leg and ribs. Subsequently, the defense challenged the defendant’s competency to proceed with trial under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002 (2009). Following a recess from the trial proceedings, both the prosecution and defense were given an opportunity to present their findings regarding the events that transpired on December 17, 2019. The prosecution argued for Mr. Flow's absence to be considered voluntary. The state further contended that Mr. Flow’s actions may not have been suicidal in nature. In contrast, defense counsel expressed the opinion that proceeding without Mr. Flow in attendance would infringe on his due process rights as well as his right to jury trial. The trial court’s analysis focused on whether Mr. Flow's actions were voluntary, rather than the question of whether his actions amounted to a suicidal gesture. The trial court concluded that Mr. Flow had voluntarily absented himself from the trial. Consequently, the trial proceedings were allowed to move forward, leading to his conviction.

Mr. Flow appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, arguing that the trial court had erred in denying defense counsel’s motion to conduct an inquiry into his capacity to proceed with trial. Mr. Flow based his arguments on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001 (2015) N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002 (2009), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals found there had been no error by the trial court. Mr. Flow then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Ruling and Reasoning

In a two to one decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the trial court did not erroneously decline to make a further inquiry into Mr. Flow's capacity to proceed with trial following the events of December 17, 2019. The court found that the initial motion by defense counsel was satisfactory in initiating the hearing procedures defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1002 (2009). But, the majority said that this statute offers only “sparse guidance regarding the procedural and substantive requirements of the competency hearing” (Flow, p 85). The majority noted that, in this instance, the trial court conducted a hearing in which the court received testimony regarding the events of December 17, 2019 and heard arguments from both the prosecution and the defense. The majority said that this examination was “statutorily sufficient because defendant was provided an opportunity to present any and all evidence relating to his competency that he was prepared to present” (Flow, p 86). Specifically, the trial court permitted defense counsel to visit Mr. Flow in the hospital and collect evidence relevant to his nonattendance in court, which the defense deemed appropriate for presentation.

The court further explained that, upon reconvening, the trial court had sought evidence concerning Mr. Flow's mental health history, any observations of prior instances of his experiencing mental or emotional disturbance, and details about Mr. Flow's behavior preceding and during his apparent suicide attempt. After reviewing all the available evidence, the trial court determined that, at the time of the alleged suicide attempt, Mr. Flow had the capacity to proceed with trial. In addition, the trial court concluded that, in regard to the events of December 17, 2019, Mr. Flow had acted in a voluntary manner and had thereby waived his right to be present at all stages of his trial. The majority acknowledged that the trial court did not consider whether Mr. Flow had attempted suicide by his jump. But, the court found that this did not indicate a disregard for the defendant's capacity to proceed at trial. The court said, “suicidality does not automatically render one incompetent; conversely, a defendant may be found incompetent by way of mental illness without being determined to be suicidal” (Flow, p 86). Hence, the court found that the trial court was not obligated to make a distinct decision as to whether Mr. Flow's actions constituted a suicidal gesture.

With regard to the Due Process Clause argument presented by Mr. Flow, the court noted that the requirements for a constitutional competency hearing are more extensive. But, these requirements are activated only when the trial court is confronted with substantive evidence indicating the defendant's incompetence. The defense highlighted three points which it argued demonstrated Mr. Flow’s incompetence: his prearrest actions which included erratic behavior (e.g., rants about being the target of gunshots, smashing of his own wristwatch without any apparent cause), the atypical use of a racial slur, and the nature of his crimes; his suicide attempt; and testimony which showed Mr. Flow was heavily medicated and experienced difficulty communicating in the hospital following his suicide attempt.

The court dismissed the third category as it concerned post-attempt events. In addition, the court emphasized that the second category on its own did not establish Mr. Flow’s incompetence. Finally, the court concluded the evidence under the first category was insufficient to demonstrate substantial evidence of Mr. Flow’s incompetence. Furthermore, the trial court had the opportunity to personally observe and engage with Mr. Flow throughout the trial. The court considered the evidence presented by the defense during the hearing and concluded that none of this evidence suggested either a history of mental illness or an inability to engage with or comprehend legal proceedings before the suicide attempt. Consequently, there was no substantial evidence warranting further investigation by the trial court.