Mental Impairment and Petitions for Post-Conviction Relief

Facts of the Case

The petitioner, Matthew Ingle, was charged with two counts of second-degree manslaughter and one count of driving under the influence of intoxicants. Mr. Ingle waived the right to a jury trial based on his defense attorney’s recommendation. During a stipulated facts trial, Mr. Ingle raised an insanity defense and was found “guilty except for insanity,” which he did not appeal. Petitioners who do not appeal their conviction have two years from the date the judgment was entered to petition for post-conviction relief according to Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(3) (2024). The Oregon post-conviction relief statute contains an escape clause that provides an exception to the two-year limitation in cases where the grounds for post-conviction relief “could not reasonably have been raised” (Ingle, p 902) within that period.

Mr. Ingle petitioned for post-conviction relief several years after the statute of limitations expired, on the grounds that his convictions resulted from substantial denial of his constitutional right to counsel. Mr. Ingle alleged that his attorney did not ensure that he “understood the consequences of being found guilty except for insanity—including that he would likely spend 20 years at the state hospital—before encouraging him to waive his right to a jury trial and raise an insanity defense” (Ingle, p 899). Additionally, Mr. Ingle alleged that, because of his mental impairments, he did not make a “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver” (Ingle, p 899) of his right to a jury trial. Regarding the untimeliness of his petition for post-conviction relief, Mr. Ingle alleged he could not have filed his petition within the statute of limitations period because he was “intellectually disabled as a result of his diagnosed schizophrenia and his forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications” (Ingle, p 899). He asserted that these factors “substantially impaired his ability to concentrate, to reason, to understand the legal remedies available to challenge his convictions, and to understand the legal proceedings that resulted in his imposed sentence” (Ingle, p 418).

The state moved to dismiss Mr. Ingle’s petition based on the two-year statute of limitations, citing Fisher v. Belleque, 240 P.3d 745 (Or. Ct. App. 2010), which held that mental impairment was irrelevant to whether the escape clause applied. The post-conviction court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the petition. Mr. Ingle appealed. The appellate court rejected Mr. Ingle’s assertion that the decision in Gutale v. State, 435 P.3d 728 (Or. 2019) implicitly overruled the decision in Fisher. In Gutale, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner’s circumstances should be considered when determining whether grounds for post-conviction relief were reasonably available to the petitioner at the time of conviction, including whether the petitioner knew there was a need to look for grounds for post-conviction relief. The appellate court stated that, in its view, the decision in Gutale only considered the petitioner’s “situation” rather than the petitioner’s “personal characteristics,” precluding the consideration of presence of mental impairment. The court upheld the decision of the post-conviction court. Mr. Ingle then petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review, which was granted.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the appellate court and post-conviction court and remanded the case to the post-conviction court for further proceedings. The court ruled that a defendant’s mental impairments can be considered when assessing applicability of the escape clause to the two-year limitation for a post-conviction relief petition and Mr. Ingle’s allegation of mental impairments, if true, constituted evidence that he could not have reasonably raised his post-conviction claims within the two-year limitations period and, as such, would fall within the meaning of the escape clause.

In its analysis, the court evaluated the statutory language of the escape clause. Specifically, the court assessed the meaning of the phrase “could not reasonably have been raised” in Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.510(3). Citing Verduzco v. State, 355 P.3d 902 (Or. 2015), the court noted that the word “could” should be interpreted as “capability” rather than “obligation.” Regarding the word “reasonably,” the court elaborated, “[W]hether the escape clause applies depends on the petitioner’s circumstances and what was reasonable under those circumstances” (Ingle, p 903). The court stated that whether a ground for post-conviction relief was “reasonably available” to a petitioner within the limitations period depends on whether the petitioner was “on notice” that there was a “need to investigate the existence of the ground for relief” (Ingle, p 905). This is a higher standard than being able to locate applicable laws.

The court noted that, in Perez-Rodriguez v. State, 435 P.3d 746 (Or. 2019), the petitioner claimed mental illness “prevented him from knowing that he had a ground for relief” (Ingle, p 905), but the court in Perez-Rodriguez did not address whether mental impairment could justify applying the escape clause because the petitioner did not establish that mental illness, such as psychosis, caused him to “not have the capacity to file his petition” (Ingle, p 906) during the limitations period. The court also noted that the word “raised” in the statutory language means “whether the petitioner was able to take the steps necessary to bring the ground for relief before a court” (Ingle, p 903). In summary, the court stated, “[W]hether the escape clause applies depends on whether it would be reasonable to expect a petitioner to have raised the ground for relief at issue given the circumstances that existed during the limitations period; if it would be unreasonable to expect the petitioner to have done so, then the escape clause applies” (Ingle, p 903).

The court evaluated the legislative history of the statute of limitations and escape clause and noted that the court’s interpretation was in line with the legislature’s purpose for the escape clause. The court noted that the escape clause should be applied in “extraordinary circumstances” and should be construed “narrowly.” Additionally, the court stated, “[T]he bar for establishing that the escape clause applies is high” (Ingle, p 913) and the petitioner bears the burden of proof.

The court concluded that a defendant’s mental impairments can be considered when assessing applicability of the escape clause to the two-year limitations period for a post-conviction relief petition. The court stated, “[I]f a petitioner is incapable of taking the steps necessary to investigate whether a ground for relief exists, the ground is not reasonably available to the petitioner” (Ingle, p 911). The court noted that presence of “mental impairment” during the two-year limitation period, when severe in degree and duration, could render someone incapable of making a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, the court stated the escape clause applies in cases where “the person cannot reasonably take those necessary steps, even with available assistance” (Ingle, p 912).

The court also ruled that Mr. Ingle’s allegation of mental impairments, if true, constituted evidence that he could not have reasonably raised his post-conviction claims within the two-year limitations period. Mr. Ingle alleged he was “intellectually disabled as a result of his diagnosed schizophrenia and his forced consumption of extremely powerful psychotropic medications” (Ingle, p 914). Mr. Ingle also alleged this disability substantially impaired his ability to understand his criminal case and if there were steps he could take to challenge his convictions. The court held that, if true, Mr. Ingle’s allegations would be sufficient to establish that he “lacked the ability to take the necessary steps to initiate a postconviction case” (Ingle, p 914) within the scope of the escape clause.