Failure to Preserve Error Prevents Certain Arguments Made Upon Appeal in Case of Contested Remote Testimony
In State v. Gomez Medina, 7 N.W.3d 350 (Iowa 2024), the Iowa Supreme Court held that the district court did not err in allowing a minor who turned 18 on the second day of closed-circuit testimony to continue with her remote testimony.
Facts of the Case
In 2019, Gomez Medina’s 15-year-old stepdaughter Dorothy (a pseudonym) reported to her school and a forensic interviewer that she had been sexually abused by Mr. Medina since she was 11 years old. This account was corroborated by Mr. Medina’s 11-year-old son Frank (a pseudonym).
In May 2020, prior to the trial, the state of Iowa sought to allow closed-circuit testimony for Dorothy and Frank under Iowa Code § 915.38 (2019), arguing that “closed-circuit testimony is necessary to protect the minor witnesses [Dorothy] and [Frank] from trauma caused by in person testimony” (Medina, p 352). Mr. Medina objected. In a subsequent pretrial hearing, Dorothy’s guardian ad litem and therapist testified that in-person testimony would cause Dorothy further trauma, with the latter also testifying that Dorothy had depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In August 2021, the district court permitted Dorothy to testify via closed-circuit testimony to prevent further trauma and because testifying in Mr. Medina’s presence would impair her ability to communicate; the request for Frank was denied because the court did not find a compelling reason.
In October 2021, the six-day trial began, with Dorothy testifying via closed-circuit testimony on the third day. Her testimony did not finish on this day. The following day, Dorothy turned 18 years old and returned to complete her testimony remotely. Prior to Dorothy starting her second day of testimony, Mr. Medina objected to Dorothy testifying via closed-circuit television on the grounds that she was no longer a minor. The district court disagreed noting that “§ 915.38(1)(c) permits closed-circuit testimony for a victim or witness with a mental illness, regardless of that person’s age” (Medina, p 353). The court concluded that Dorothy would experience additional trauma to her underlying mental illness with in-person testimony. With the court’s permission, the now adult Dorothy resumed her closed-circuit testimony. Mr. Medina was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 67 years in prison.
On appeal, Mr. Medina raised three arguments. Primarily, he argued that “allowing Dorothy to testify via closed-circuit television violated both Iowa Code § 915.38(1) and the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend VI (‘in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to be confronted with the witnesses against him’)” (Medina, p 353).
The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling, explaining that no constitutional violation occurred when Dorothy was a minor. Likewise, the court held that, after she turned 18, Dorothy met the requirements for closed-circuit testimony under Iowa Code § 915.38(1)(c). Mr. Medina’s argument for a Confrontation Clause violation also failed. Mr. Medina appealed.
Ruling and Reasoning
The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the district court’s ruling, noting that Mr. Medina “failed to preserve error on his Confrontation Clause argument concerning Dorothy’s testimony after she turned 18” (Medina, p 354). The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the transcript of the district court proceedings of events prior to Dorothy beginning her second day of testimony, when the district court discussed whether Dorothy would still be allowed to testify via closed circuit as an 18 year old. The court found that the district court and both sides had the opportunity to question Dorothy about her medications and mental health. The district court noted that unexpected delays at trial had caused Dorothy’s testimony to extend into a second day, even though the pretrial order had only contemplated her closed-circuit testimony as a minor. Further, the district court had determined that Dorothy had a documented mental illness of PTSD and depression, which would cause Dorothy trauma beyond the expected “nervousness and excitement” of normal testimony, “regardless of her age” (Medina, p 355), specifically while testifying in front of Mr. Medina. The district court had eventually allowed Dorothy to testify via closed circuit.
The court noted that Mr. Medina’s defense had in fact raised the concern of both the Iowa Code § 915.38 and Confrontation Clause during the pretrial motion when discussing Dorothy’s testimony as a minor. The Iowa Supreme Court commented that closed-circuit testimony was discussed only in relationship to Dorothy’s status as a minor during the pretrial hearing, stating, “it apparently hadn’t occurred to anyone that Dorothy might not give her testimony until after she’d turned eighteen.” (Medina, p 355).
The court noted that, during the trial, Mr. Medina objected to Dorothy’s testimony on the second day only under § 915.38, but not under the Confrontation Clause. The court underscored the requirement that a party raise a concern and that the district court rule on it before it could be considered on appeal. The Supreme Court of Iowa noted that it functions to correct errors made by lower courts. If a concern was not raised in a lower court, and the lower court had not ruled on it, they had no error to correct. The court further explained that they were unsure how the district court would have ruled had Mr. Medina’s defense brought up the matter of the Confrontation Cause.
The Iowa Supreme Court found that the district court’s decision to permit Dorothy to testify remotely was based on evidence presented at the pretrial phase in the testimony of the guardian ad litem and Dorothy’s therapist. The guardian ad litem had testified that Dorothy would be traumatized if testifying in the presence of Mr. Medina and that this would affect her ability to testify truthfully. Similarly, Dorothy’s therapist had testified that Dorothy experiences PTSD, anxiety, and depression because of the abuse she had suffered and that closed-circuit testimony would protect her from further trauma. The court ruled that the district court correctly applied Iowa Code Section 915.38 in Dorothy’s case by permitting her continued testimony via closed-circuit testimony as an adult, given her underlying mental illness. They explained that Iowa Code § 915.38(1)(c) permits a court to allow for closed-circuit testimony of a victim or witness with “mental illness, an intellectual disability, or other developmental disability to be taken … regardless of the age of the victim or witness” (Medina, p 356).
The Iowa Supreme Court also concluded that the district court correctly denied Frank’s request for closed-circuit testimony. They noted that Frank did not present with mental disability to the extent that Dorothy had. The court declined to address Mr. Medina’s additional two arguments.
Discussion
In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (Cal. 1990), the U.S. Supreme Court established that sexually abused minors can testify under closed-circuit testimony and still not violate the Confrontation Clause if there are concerns that they will experience trauma by testifying in front of their accuser. In Medina, the Supreme Court of Iowa elucidated that even adults could be excused from in-person testimony if there is a possibility that they might be traumatized by testifying in the presence of their accuser.
In People v. Stritzinger, 668 P.2d 738 (Cal. 1983), the California Supreme Court had noted that the evidentiary bar for making an exception for a victim or witness to testify in person is high. There, the district court excused the victim from in-person testimony under the Confrontation Clause based solely on the report of the victim’s mother. Upon appeal, the California Supreme Court ruled that the testimony of the victim’s mother was legally insufficient and that medical testimony was needed to support a mental health diagnosis. In contrast, the district court in Medina considered the testimony of Dorothy’s therapist and that of the guardian ad litem when making their determination on the presence and severity of mental illness for Dorothy and her brother, the potential for further traumatization, and how in-person testimony could affect their ability to testify in court.
Taken together, these decisions illustrate that, although the bar to make an exception to the Confrontation Clause is high, courts have considered the potential of further traumatizing abuse victims in ruling upon such exceptions. Further, courts do not make these exceptions lightly and are required to rely on credible evidence provided by caregivers or health care providers in making exceptions to the right to confront one’s accuser.
- © 2025 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
