Extreme Racial Views That Affect Decision Making Do Not Necessarily Render an Individual Incompetent to Stand Trial or Negate a Right to Self-Representation
In United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314 (4th Cir. 2021), Dylan Roof challenged his conviction and death sentence on religious obstruction and firearm counts. Mr. Roof argued that the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina erroneously found him competent to stand trial and erred in granting his motion to proceed pro se during the penalty phase of his conviction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina did not err in determining that Mr. Roof was competent to stand trial or by granting Mr. Roof’s motion to dismiss his counsel and proceed pro se. The Fourth Circuit further rejected Mr. Roof’s challenges of alleged errors involving the validity of his conviction under the federal religious-obstruction statute and procedural errors related to his death verdict.
Facts of the Case
On June 17, 2015, Mr. Roof entered the Fellowship Hall of Mother Emanuel, a historic African American church. He joined the church leaders and twelve African American parishioners for their nightly Bible study. Mr. Roof carried a small bag containing a concealed Glock .45 semi-automatic handgun and eight magazines loaded with eleven bullets each. He participated in the Bible study, and after forty-five minutes of worship, Mr. Roof began shooting parishioners while they prayed. He fired approximately seventy-four rounds. Mr. Roof kept one of the parishioners alive to tell the story. He left the church after killing nine parishioners.
The police stopped Mr. Roof while driving in Shelby, North Carolina. He was taken to the police station without incident. The FBI obtained a written Miranda waiver. During the interview, Mr. Roof identified himself as a “white nationalist.” The FBI asked if Mr. Roof was trying to start a revolution, and he responded, “I’m not delusional, I don’t think that [,] you know, that something like what I did could start a race war or anything like that” (Roof, p 332). Prior to the attack, Mr. Roof researched Mother Emanuel, and he learned of the Bible study group that met on Wednesday nights. Hours before the shootings, he uploaded racist materials to a website that he created.
Mr. Roof was initially charged with murder, attempted murder, and weapon possession by the state of South Carolina. He was later indicted in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina with several counts of racially motivated hate crimes resulting in death (and attempts to kill), obstructing religious exercise resulting in death, and the use of a firearm to commit murder during (and in relation to) a crime of violence. The federal government sought the death penalty. Mr. Roof filed a motion for a complete dismissal of the indictment on the principal grounds that the religious-obstruction charges were invalid as he did not engage in interstate commerce. This motion was denied by the district court.
Mr. Roof’s lawyers requested an evaluation of his competency to stand trial after he sent a letter to the prosecution expressing strong opposition to his lawyers’ presenting mental illness mitigation evidence that he believed would discredit his racial motivations for committing the murders. The court-appointed expert testified that Mr. Roof was competent to stand trial because he did not have difficulty understanding criminal proceedings and it was clear that he could cooperate with his attorneys if he desired. The expert further opined that Mr. Roof’s unwillingness to cooperate was not due to psychosis but rooted in a “deep-seated racial prejudice.” Multiple defense experts testified that Mr. Roof had autism spectrum disorder and appeared delusional, possibly exhibiting a psychotic disorder.
One defense expert commented on Mr. Roof’s competency to stand trial, opining him incompetent due to the presumably psychotic belief that he would not be executed even if he were sentenced to death. The other defense experts expressed “concerns” about Mr. Roof’s competency but did not opine directly on competency. During the hearing, Mr. Roof told the court that he did not communicate with his attorneys because he did not agree with their mitigation strategy and that he committed his crimes to increase racial tensions. The district court determined that Mr. Roof was competent to stand trial. The district court granted Mr. Roof’s motion to dismiss his counsel and proceed pro se during the penalty phase of his capital trial to prevent his lawyers from presenting mental illness mitigation evidence.
Another competency hearing was conducted prior to the penalty phase of the trial after Mr. Roof’s advisory counsel challenged his competency to stand trial and his ability to represent himself during the penalty phase. His advisory counsel was concerned after Mr. Roof forwent presenting mitigation evidence. The court-appointed expert again opined that Mr. Roof was competent. Defense experts provided updated reports, but none had reexamined Mr. Roof since the initial competency hearing. Mr. Roof confirmed during the second hearing that he wanted to represent himself and prevent his lawyers from undermining his message with mental illness evidence. The district court found Mr. Roof “plainly competent to proceed.” Mr. Roof represented himself during the penalty phase and he did not present mental health mitigation evidence. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to death. Mr. Roof appealed the district court’s verdict in four broad categories: his competency to stand trial; his self-representation; and alleged errors in the penalty and guilt phases of the trial, including whether the charging statutes were unconstitutional.
Ruling and Reasoning
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court’s determination of Mr. Roof’s competency was not clear error and did not warrant reversal. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court appropriately applied the standards outlined in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) in both competency determinations, by considering testimony from a credible court-appointed expert, direct observations of Mr. Roof, and Mr. Roof’s own testimony. The court-appointed expert opined that Mr. Roof chose not to communicate with his lawyers to avoid contaminating the messaging of his crimes with mental illness evidence. The defense experts (except for one) did not comment on how Mr. Roof’s alleged psychotic symptoms or autism spectrum disorder diagnosis affected his competency. Discrepancy between expert opinions did not warrant reversal of the district court’s competency determination. The district court was within its discretion to rely upon the court-appointed expert’s testimony and its own observations of Mr. Roof.
The Fourth Circuit determined that the district court did not err in granting Mr. Roof’s motion to proceed pro se. A competent defendant’s right to self-representation is implied in the Sixth Amendment and was ratified by the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Mr. Roof’s claim that he did not have the right to self-representation during the penalty phase failed because the rights outlined in Faretta encompassed the right to self-representation in capital sentence hearings. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s assigning control of legal tactical decisions (including whether to present mental illness evidence) to Mr. Roof’s attorneys. Mr. Roof relied on United States v. Read, 918 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2019) (outlining a defendant’s right to avoid an insanity defense) to argue that he be allowed to restrict his lawyers from presenting mental illness evidence. His claim was rejected because decisions about presenting evidence were “far less consequential” than the admission of guilt required in insanity defenses. The Fourth Circuit rejected Mr. Roof’s other contentions about the constitutionality of the federal charging statutes and procedural errors during his trial.
Discussion
The decision in United States v. Roof underscores the necessity of assessing for a nexus between observed psychopathology and psycho-legal abilities. Dusky prescribes the standard for finding a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Assessing competency involves the careful determination of a defendant’s understanding of criminal proceedings and ability to assist in one’s defense. The presence of a mental illness and symptoms alone do not automatically imply incompetence. A forensic evaluator must clearly determine the impact of psychiatric symptoms on competency.
Although Mr. Roof’s racist views were difficult to comprehend, they were not necessarily psychotic and warranted proper investigation. Individuals may harbor extreme views while not meeting criteria for a formal mental disorder. Regardless, Mr. Roof’s extreme racial beliefs were solely not enough to render him incompetent to stand trial or to prevent him from proceeding pro se. The tension between Mr. Roof and his attorneys regarding the proper legal strategy affected court proceedings. The court and Mr. Roof’s attorneys posed an important forensic question to the experts: did Mr. Roof’s beliefs stem from a mental illness that was affecting his legal decision-making? Most of the defense experts expressed their concerns about Mr. Roof’s beliefs but did not directly comment on how those beliefs affected his competency. The court assigned more credibility to the expert who directly and thoroughly answered the question of Mr. Roof’s competency to stand trial. United States v. Roof is a reminder for forensic experts to comprehensively answer the forensic questions posed.
- © 2022 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
