Criminal Sentencing of Mentally Ill Persons

Facts of the Case

In November 2003, Paul Schneider was convicted of theft of government money and Social Security fraud. He had applied for disability benefits in 1984 after having an acute manic episode while in the Marine Corps on a tour of duty on the Indian Ocean. He was evacuated to Guam and then transported to a hospital in Washington, D.C., where he spent eight months in a locked psychiatric facility. He was transferred to the Veteran's Administration Hospital for three months of inpatient treatment, after which he filed for Title II disability benefits.

Since 1984, he had experienced repeated manic episodes with psychotic symptoms. During one episode, he was involved in a high-speed police chase while under the belief that he was participating in a training maneuver for the police department. Mr. Schneider was hired by the Social Security Administration as a telephone service representative from April 1997 to August 2000. During this period, he continued to receive disability benefits from the Social Security Administration, although his income exceeded the minimum amount that constitutes “substantial gainful work” under Title II of the Social Security Act.

Upon conviction, he was sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that: (1) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated, because his sentence was enhanced by judge-found facts under the then-mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines; (2) the district court erred in denying him a downward departure for diminished capacity under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (2000); and (3) the district court erred in denying him an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (2002). Upon resentencing in November 2003, Mr. Schneider provided evidence of his mental illness, including a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Fiester, who concluded that he “suffers from a lifelong psychiatric disorder which is disabling.” He was thought to have demonstrated symptoms of both bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Dr. Fiester explained that Mr. Schneider had a distorted view of reality and believed that he was entitled to financial benefits from both work and disability. During the hearing, the district court considered whether Mr. Schneider qualified for an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility or for a departure for diminished capacity. The court denied both, and imposed the original sentence. The case was appealed to determine whether the proceedings were consistent with United States v. Ameline.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit noted the need to remand the case in light of United States v. Ameline. The sentencing court had adjusted the guideline range upward, although there was no sufficient evidence for this in the record. Under Ameline when: …[T]he record is insufficiently clear to conduct a complete plain error analysis, a limited remand to the district court is appropriate for the purpose of ascertaining whether the sentence imposed would have been materially different had the district court known that the sentencing guidelines were advisory [Ameline, 409 F.3d, p 1073].

The court of appeals noted that the district court's refusal for departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 rested on two significant errors: the misapprehension of departure authority for diminished capacity and the misapplication of the standard for acceptance of responsibility. The court noted, “The goal of § 5K2.13 is lenity toward defendants whose ability to make reasoned decisions is impaired.” Under this guideline: “ ′significant reduced mental capacity' means the defendant, although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful” (Schneider, 429 F.3d, p 891). When determining a defendant's mental capacity, sentencing courts must consider both the cognitive and the volitional elements. The district court had limited the determination of diminished capacity to the cognitive element. The sentencing hearing transcript indicated only that the wrongfulness of Mr. Schneider's behavior was considered. The district court had not considered whether Mr. Schneider had had the power to control his behavior or to conform to the law.

The second error of the district court in considering a departure from the sentencing guidelines was conflating the standards for diminished capacity with those for the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. The court noted, “To receive an acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment, a defendant must truthfully admit the conduct comprising the offense and manifest adequate contrition for his or her actions in a timely manner.” While discussing the adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the court stated that Mr. Schneider, “knew exactly what he was doing throughout the commission of the crime.” This statement applied more to his understanding of the offense than to his current acceptance of responsibility. The district court had viewed his diminished capacity “in light of” his acceptance of responsibility, thus conflating these standards.

Discussion

Initially, this case looks like a standard remand consistent with Ameline proceedings. The defendant was sentenced for theft, there were necessary adjustments for the amount of funds, and the case was remanded for resentencing. The unique slant lies within the concurrence by Justice Ferguson, who opined that the case is an example of the potential complications of evaluating mentally ill defendants for diminished capacity or for acceptance of responsibility. The determination of diminished capacity necessitates consideration of both the cognitive and volitional prongs of the standard. The standard for acceptance of responsibility must remain separate from the standard for diminished capacity. The nature of severe psychiatric illness makes it possible that the defendant's ability to accept responsibility for the behavior is impaired, even if she or he has a superficial understanding that the behavior is wrong. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the failure to accept responsibility equates with an ability to control behavior, which would fulfill the volitional prong of the diminished-capacity standard. Mr. Schneider appeared to understand the wrongfulness of his behavior (fulfilling the cognitive prong for determining diminished capacity). Based on his delusional beliefs, he thought that his behavior was justified, but the question of his control remained unanswered. Psychiatrists may be asked to evaluate mentally ill persons for diminished capacity or acceptance of responsibility. As exemplified by Schneider, it is essential that the standards for these findings be made clear in consultations from attorneys and in the psychiatric evaluations.