Battered-Child Syndrome

Facts of the Case

In the late evening of January 13, 2005, Jason MacLennan shot his father, Kenneth MacLennan, six times with a .22-caliber rifle. Mr. MacLennan testified that he was fearful of his father and shot him in self-defense. His best friend, Matt Moeller, testified that he and Mr. MacLennan had devised a plan to kill Kenneth MacLennan.

Before trial, Mr. MacLennan made an offer of proof to demonstrate the basis of his claim that his father severely emotionally abused him. This included potential testimony from his family, friends, and neighbors. These individuals were willing to testify that Kenneth MacLennan physically and sexually abused Mr. MacLennan's mother before she died of cancer in 1999. They were also willing to testify that Mr. MacLennan was neglected by his father who left him alone to serve as his mother's primary caretaker when she was ill. The proffered testimony on the relationship between Mr. MacLennan and his father focused primarily on Mr. MacLennan's fear of his father and his father's bad temper.

Mr. MacLennan also sought to offer expert testimony on battered-child syndrome, which the district court determined would need to be presented at a Frye-Mack hearing (described below) before trial, because it presented a novel scientific theory in Minnesota. At the Frye-Mack hearing, Dr. Michael Arambula testified that the term battered-child syndrome has evolved to encompass the psychological symptoms suffered by children who have been battered. He testified that few children who suffer from this syndrome actually attack their abusers, but that when they do, the attack usually involves excessive force because the child is unable to control his or her emotions. Two psychiatrists rebutted this testimony. Dr. Carl Malmquist said that in the psychiatric community, battered-child syndrome “is not, at this point, well tested and confirmed enough to gain credibility that there is such an accepted syndrome” (State v. MacLennan, p 227). The other psychiatrist's testimony was consistent with Dr. Malmquist's testimony.

The district court concluded that Mr. MacLennan did not meet the burden under the Frye-Mack standard. Under the Frye-Mack standard, a novel scientific theory may be admitted if it has: (1) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community; and (2) foundational reliability. This decision was based on the failure of Dr. Arambula's testimony to demonstrate general acceptance of battered-child syndrome, and the insufficiency of evidence offered to demonstrate that Mr. MacLennan suffered from severe emotional abuse. The court allowed testimony on the relationship between Jason and his father. At trial, Mr. MacLennan testified that his father was verbally abusive and distant. He said that his father burned his arm with a cigarette once when he caught him smoking and also testified that his father once threatened him with a knife during an argument. Family and friends testified that Mr. MacLennan was afraid of his father, but never expressed intent to kill him. The state offered testimony from some of Jason MacLennan's friends, who said Mr. MacLennan frequently discussed a desire to have his father killed and remarked about the amount of money he would inherit. During the closing argument, the state frequently referred to the shooting as a “premeditated ambush execution.”

Mr. MacLennan was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Mr. MacLennan raised two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony on battered-child syndrome; and (2) whether the state's comments on closing argument constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred when it applied the Frye-Mack standard to determine whether expert testimony on battered-child syndrome was admissible at trial. The court ruled that although the Frye-Mack standard is applicable in other areas of scientific expertise, it is not the appropriate standard for “syndrome” evidence. The court relied on several previous cases, including State v. Hennum (441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989)), in which the court declined to use the Frye-Mack standard in determining the admissibility of expert testimony on battered-woman syndrome and instead analyzed whether the evidence met the standards of Minnesota Rules of Evidence 402 and 702 (that is, must be relevant, helpful to the trier-of-fact, and given by a witness qualified as an expert). The testimony on battered-woman syndrome was deemed admissible because it would be helpful to the jury by explaining a “phenomenon not within the understanding of the ordinary lay person” and the court in MacLennan determined that the same reasoning should apply to battered-child syndrome. The court noted that in the area of “syndromes,” experts do not administer specific tests to determine whether the defendant suffers from the syndrome and, furthermore, “such experts may not testify about whether a particular defendant actually suffers from a syndrome” (State v. MacLennan, p 233). The court therefore concluded that “expert testimony on syndromes, unlike DNA evidence or other physical science, is not the type of evidence that the analytic framework established by Frye-Mack was designed to address” (State v. MacLennan, p 233). The court determined that this approach (of allowing experts to present evidence of the syndrome but not testify whether the particular defendant suffers from it) preserves the interest in “allowing the jury to serve as fact finders, with the role of determining whether a particular defendant suffers from battered-child syndrome, and does not allow that role to be usurped by experts” (State v. MacLennan, p 234).

The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that although the trial court erred in applying the wrong standard, the error was harmless because the defendant did not establish the relevance of the expert testimony on battered-child syndrome to his claim of self-defense. The court found that the defendant demonstrated a tense relationship with his father, but that there was little evidence to suggest the relationship rose to the level of battered-child syndrome as it was described by the defendant's own expert. Thus, they concluded that the trial court did not err when it excluded the expert testimony.

Discussion

In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the standard for admission of expert witness testimony on “syndrome” evidence should be broader than the Frye standard of general acceptance in the field, and should focus on whether such testimony would be helpful to the trier-of-fact. In particular, the court ruled that expert testimony about battered-child syndrome does meet the “helpfulness” criteria under Minnesota Rule 702 (which is similar to the Federal Rule of Evidence), which states that: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise [Minnesota Rule of Evidence 702 (Cited in State v. MacLennan, p 233)].

However, the admission of such evidence is limited to a general description of the syndrome, and the expert cannot testify about whether the defendant suffers from the syndrome. Furthermore, such evidence will only be admitted as relevant if there is a factual basis established to suggest that the defendant indeed presented with characteristics of the syndrome.