Competence to Stand Trial

Facts of the Case

Mark Born was arrested and charged with unlawful conduct after he repeatedly refused to get off a bus after the completion of its route, raised his fist and cocked it back as if to hit the driver, and told the driver to take him where he wanted to go. At arraignment, the district court ordered an evaluation of Mr. Born's competence to stand trial. Subsequently, the court reviewed the evaluation and the police report and concluded that Mr. Born was incompetent and that the pending charge alleged a violent act. Under the Revised Code of Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)), a court may stay a misdemeanor prosecution and commit the defendant for mental health treatment and competency restoration if he is charged with one or more violent acts and has been found incompetent. Accordingly, the court ordered Mr. Born's commitment to a state psychiatric facility.

Mr. Born, though not contesting that he was incompetent, filed a habeas corpus petition in superior court, arguing that the facts had not sufficiently supported the trial court's determination that he had been charged with a violent act. The superior court held that under either a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard or a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the pending charge alleged a violent act.

Mr. Born appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals. This court, holding that the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence and that the evidence established that Mr. Born was charged with a violent act, affirmed the superior court's denial of the writ. Mr. Born, arguing that the standard of proof the state must meet is proof by clear and convincing evidence, then appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.

Ruling and Reasoning

Determining the standard of proof that applies to civil commitment is a due process inquiry that requires a court to balance the interests at stake and consider the risk of an erroneous decision (e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)). Applying the Mathews test to the Revised Code of Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)), the Supreme Court of Washington held that due process requires that proving the prerequisites for committing a misdemeanant defendant for mental health treatment and competency restoration must be by clear and convincing evidence. Moreover, the court determined that, under this standard, the state did not prove that Mr. Born was charged with a violent act.

In applying the balancing test of Mathews, the court first considered the individual interests at stake. Under the Revised Code of Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)), an individual charged with a misdemeanor that is a violent act may be committed for up to 29 days. The court, quoting from Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 at 425 (1979), observed that a “commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,” and, further, that commitment for mental health treatment may give rise to adverse social consequences due to stigma associated with civil commitment.

As to the governmental interests involved in this case, the court pointed out that, in enacting the statute, the legislature noted the goal of increasing public safety. The court reasoned that another governmental interest at stake is the interest in prosecution of misdemeanors, an interest that is evident given the statute's purpose of restoring the misdemeanant defendant to competency to stand trial. The court observed that the first interest, that of public safety, must be considered in light of the fact that the potential penalties for a misdemeanor are relatively light. Thus, the court reasoned that detention for treatment and restoration of competency under the Revised Code of Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)) may have little effect in providing for public safety. Moreover, the court pointed out that when an individual poses a danger to the public as a result of mental illness, the state can already seek involuntary commitment under another statute. As to the governmental interest in prosecuting misdemeanors, the court observed that the U.S. Supreme Court stated in regard to restoring a defendant to competency through administration of antipsychotic medications that “[t]he Government's interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important” (Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 at 180 (2003)). The Supreme Court of Washington noted that implicit in this statement is the premise that the relative importance of governmental interest in prosecuting those charged with crimes correlates to the seriousness of the crime. Because the government does not have the same interest in prosecuting misdemeanant defendants as it does in prosecuting defendants charged with felonies, the court reasoned that the preponderance standard does not strike the proper balance in the case of those charged with misdemeanors and that “[t]he individual liberty interest at stake here weighs more heavily in balance than the governmental interests in public safety and prosecution of misdemeanors” (Born v. Thompson, p 1102).

Regarding the risk of an erroneous decision, the court noted that, in Washington, once an individual is found incompetent to stand trial, all that is required for commitment in the case of a misdemeanor is that there be a pending charge against the defendant for a violent act. This, the court noted, promotes a significant risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty.

Thus, the court determined that, given the level of risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty and given that the individual interests weigh heavily against the governmental interests, the clear-and-convincing standard of proof must apply with regard to the Revised Code of Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)). Also, the court noted that a determination of future dangerousness equivalent to that required for civil commitment or commitment as an insanity acquittee under Washington law was not required in competency proceedings, although an opinion regarding a defendant's dangerousness is required.

Finally, in light of the necessity for clear and convincing evidence, the court agreed with Mr. Born's contention that the facts did not establish that he was charged with a violent act. The court pointed out that an incompetent defendant may not be able to assist in challenging the state's claims about the alleged conduct. Further, the fact that Mr. Born, among other things, cocked his fist does not clearly and convincingly lead to the inference that Mr. Born intended to strike the driver, nor was there evidence that showed clearly and convincingly that he was within reach to carry out any “threatened” behavior.

Discussion

This case illustrates the balancing acts courts have to perform in applying the Mathews test to ensure procedural due process safeguards. In Addington, the U.S. Supreme Court, applying the Mathews test, held that a clear-and-convincing standard of proof applies to indefinite involuntary civil commitment proceedings. Using the same test, the Supreme Court of Washington, which had previously determined that the preponderance standard satisfies due process for a 14-day involuntary commitment (In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1986)) but that the clear-and-convincing standard is required for a 90-day civil commitment (Dunner v. McLaughlin, 676 P.2d 444 (Wash. 1984)), determined that, for the Revised Code of Washington (Wash. Rev. Code § 10.77.090(1)(d)(i)), wherein there is significant risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and the individual interests weigh heavily against those of the government, the standard should be clear-and-convincing evidence.

More remarkably, this case highlights potential pitfalls in determining what offenses are serious enough to require involuntary commitment for competency restoration. Further, it highlights the unique position of mandated inpatient competency restoration with regard to the balancing test it raises between deprivation of liberty and protection of public safety. Whereas Sell, in addressing the question of forced medication for competency restoration, concerns itself in part with “serious” but “nonviolent” offenses, this case to a certain extent attempts to tease out “What is serious?” and “What is violent?” albeit in the context of involuntary commitment for competence restoration as opposed to forced medication per se. Especially in light of Sell, courts will need to continue weighing on a case-by-case basis the balance between governmental interests and individual interests in competency restoration. In doing so, perhaps a consensus will eventually emerge regarding what exactly is a “serious” enough offense to warrant infringing on individual interests.