Propriety of Closing Statements Regarding Release of Acquittees in Insanity Defense Case

Facts of the Case

Ms. Dalton has a long history of mental illness, including bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, and substance abuse. In July 2009, Ms. Dalton was admitted to a crisis treatment facility and was prescribed escitalopram, a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressant. Her treaters at the facility were unaware that Ms. Dalton had reacted negatively when prescribed a different SSRI, fluoxetine. During her inpatient stay, Ms. Dalton received multiple diagnoses, including cocaine dependence, cannabis abuse, substance-induced mood disorder, and borderline personality disorder. She was discharged after approximately three days and continued to take escitalopram. On August 20, 2009, approximately three weeks after her discharge, Ms. Dalton's boyfriend contacted her mother and asked her to check on Ms. Dalton, who appeared depressed. Ms. Dalton's mother also observed Ms. Dalton's “strange behavior” and went to the local magistrate's office, in an effort to have Ms. Dalton involuntarily committed. She was instead told to speak with a social worker and return to the magistrate's office the next day. That night, Ms. Dalton bartered electronics for a gram of crack cocaine. In the early morning of August 21, 2009, Ms. Dalton knocked on her neighbors' door claiming to have money that she owed the neighbor. When the door was opened, Ms. Dalton forced her way in and repeatedly stabbed her two neighbors, calling one by the wrong name. One neighbor died and the other sustained serious injuries. Ms. Dalton was soon located, still wearing bloodied clothing and attempting to get a ride. She was brought to the police station, where she refused to speak with law enforcement agents after being read her Miranda rights.

Ms. Dalton was indicted on October 5, 2009, for “first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury” (Dalton, p 487). She notified the court of her intent to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and was thereafter evaluated by a psychiatrist to determine her competency to proceed, as well as to evaluate her mental state at the time of the offense. During the trial, the defense offered a neuropharmacology expert, who testified to the negative impact SSRIs can have on patients with bipolar disorder, as well as the effects of illicit drugs on Ms. Dalton's behavior at the time of the crime. A second defense expert, a psychiatrist, offered further testimony regarding Ms. Dalton's state of mind at the time of the crime, including the impact of her history of mental illness, her drug use, and her negative reaction to SSRIs, on her mental state. No experts were offered by the prosecution.

During a trial conference, the prosecutor requested permission to comment on civil commitment procedures during his closing argument. Permission was granted, though he was instructed not to exaggerate Ms. Dalton's likelihood of release after 50 days. The prosecutor did, however, make statements to that effect: “… and it is very possible that in 50 days, if she shows by a preponderance of the evidence that she is not a threat to anyone else or herself she will be back home … [defense objects and is overruled] … she very well could be back home in less than two months …” (Dalton, p 488).

The prosecutor also asserted that Ms. Dalton's request for counsel and refusal to speak further in the absence of counsel while being questioned at the police station, after being informed of her right to do so, was an indication of her sanity at the time of the crime. On April 14, 2014, Ms. Dalton was found guilty of all charges.

Ms. Dalton appealed her convictions based on two procedural errors: the trial court erred in overruling her objection to the prosecutor's statements regarding her likely length of civil commitment upon a finding of NGRI; and the trial court failed to intervene of its own accord when the state argued that Ms. Dalton's request for counsel was evidence of sanity. The court of appeals unanimously found prejudicial error in the prosecutor's assertion that it was “very possible” Ms. Dalton would be released in 50 days, and she was granted a new trial. The court of appeals did not address Ms. Dalton's claim regarding the trial court's failure to intervene when the prosecutor argued that her request for counsel during police interrogation weighed against an NGRI finding.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina granted the state's petition for discretionary review on March 17, 2016, to determine whether the appellate court “‘[e]rred in distorting the transcript, applying the incorrect standard of review, and finding prejudicial error’” (Dalton, p 488), based on the prosecutor's closing argument statements.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the court of appeal's decision and granted a new trial, ruling that the abuse-of-discretion standard was correctly applied to the prosecutor's closing argument. The supreme court found prejudicial error, relying on State v. Millsaps, 610 S.E.2d 437 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005), on the basis that the trial evidence did not support the prosecutor's assertions during closing arguments, and on State v. Jones, 558 S.E.2d 97, 108 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002): “Improper remarks may be prejudicial, either because of their individual stigma or because of the general tenor of the argument as a whole.” Justice Jackson concurred, agreeing with the outcome of the majority decision, but writing “to emphasize the impropriety of the prosecutor's jury argument” (Dalton, p 491), citing State v. Hammonds, 224 S.E.2d 595 (N.C. 1976), and asserting that the prosecutor inappropriately inflamed the jury, invoking stigma and fear for community safety. Chief Justice Martin dissented, raising a literal interpretation of “very possible,” suggesting that this meant something merely had the potential to occur rather than being probable or likely to occur: [The prosecutor] “merely said that she would win her hearing if she proved her case” (Dalton, p 495, emphasis in original). This concrete argument focused on the literal definition of wording rather than the question of stigma and prejudicing the jury.