Suitable Treatment Facility for Federal Defendants Found Incompetent and Not Restorable

Shykina Brown; Lindsay Oberleitner

Commitment to the Custody of the Bureau of Prisons for Competence Restoration Is Constitutional Regardless of Medical Evidence of Nonrestorability

In U.S. v. Dalasta, 856 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2017), the defendant, Kevin Dalasta, appealed the Iowa district court's order for commitment to the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to determine whether he could be restored to competency to stand trial. Mr. Dalasta argued that the court's order for commitment was unconstitutional because of medical evidence supporting the unlikelihood of restoration and that the court failed to consider more suitable alternatives available to the BOP to meet the duty to commit. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the order of the district court to commit Mr. Dalasta to the custody of the BOP, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2015), requiring the commitment of a defendant found incompetent to stand trial. The attorney general assumes responsibility for committing the defendant to a suitable treatment facility.

Facts of the Case

Mr. Dalasta had a temporal lobectomy to address a worsening seizure condition in March 2012. During this time, he was facing charges from 2010 for vehicular homicide. The case was delayed due to Mr. Dalasta's medical procedures. Based on an evaluation by Dr. Michael Taylor, the court suspended the proceedings, pursuant to Iowa Code § 812.5 (2012), and requested a further examination to determine whether competency could be restored. In July 2012, Dr. Taylor, opined that Mr. Dalasta was not competent and not restorable. That August, a second examiner, Dr. Eric Barlow, reported that restoration was not possible because of cognitive deficits resulting from the lobectomy. In March 2013, a third evaluator, Dr. Robert Jones, also opined that Mr. Dalasta was not competent to stand trial, with no possibility of restoration. In May 2013, a hearing was held, and the vehicular homicide case was dismissed because of a lack of substantial evidence of competence restorability within a reasonable amount of time.

In October 2015, it was alleged that, after an argument with his father, Mr. Dalasta placed a gun to his own chin. Police arrived at his parents' home, where he resided, and removed four firearms. Mr. Dalasta was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm as a prohibited person (18 U.S.C. § 922 (2015)). The district court moved for a competency evaluation, and once again, an evaluator opined that Mr. Dalasta was incompetent and not restorable. Despite the defense counsel's argument against mandatory commitment for competency restoration because of medical records indicating cognitive deficits resulting from his seizure condition, he was committed to the custody of the BOP to determine whether competency could be restored.

Mr. Dalasta appealed the order of commitment to the BOP, arguing that the district court erred in mandating commitment, given undisputed evidence from his previous criminal case of inability to restore his competency to stand trial; the strict application of this order of commitment is unconstitutional and violates his liberty interest under the Due Process Clause; and the district court neglected to consider other disposition options for determining nonrestorability.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to commit Mr. Dalasta to the custody of the BOP. It agreed that the language in 18 U.S.C.S. § 4241(d) (2015) imposes mandatory commitment to the custody of the attorney general, therefore placing the duty to commit and select a suitable treatment facility on the attorney general rather than the district court.

The court referenced the provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 96 (2015) under which the BOP is authorized to perform the functions of the attorney general and make decisions about appropriate placement. The court disagreed with Mr. Dalasta that commitment to the custody of the attorney general is “absurd,” even in the face of extensive evidence showing nonrestorability, because the question of dangerousness upon release from custody would still have to be considered, and the assessment by the BOP would accomplish that. Finally, the court disagreed with Mr. Dalasta's argument that such commitment is a violation of his constitutional right to liberty. The steps outlined in the determination of the competency to stand trial statute include a limited deprivation of liberty if a defendant is found not competent, and this complies with due process.

Although the court affirmed the district court's commitment to the BOP, the court expressed concern that the BOP, by its guideline that requires forensic evaluations be done on a BOP Psychiatric Referral Center inpatient unit, may unduly restrict the statutory discretion of the attorney general in selecting a suitable facility when warranted. This point was not raised by Mr. Dalasta.

Discussion

Although the circuit court affirmed the decision of the district court, Mr. Dalasta's appeal raised an important question about the options available to the federal courts when defendants are found not competent and not restorable. The procedure after such a finding is limited and vague.

When a defendant is found not competent, 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2015) specifies that the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the attorney general, who shall hospitalize the defendant in a suitable treatment facility for a reasonable period of time to determine restorability. At present, there are no statutorily permitted alternatives. For individuals who are unable to regain competency within the limited time constraints for restoration, 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (2015), states that such persons should be held in a suitable treatment facility until the state assumes responsibility, or he is eligible for conditional release and no longer a risk to the public. In both statutes, the phrase “suitable treatment facility” indicates discretionary placements without procedures for determining how the decisions about placements will be made. Despite the statute allowing the discretion of a “suitable treatment facility,” the regulations of the attorney general authorize the BOP to fulfill the functions under the statute and determine placement. As the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals observed in this case, the inflexibility of the BOP may restrict reasonable discretion for placement. The BOP knows about federal prisons and their capacity to assess, treat, and manage prisoners with psychiatric needs; however, they are not familiar with alternative facilities across states and communities.

Although inpatient commitment affords the opportunity for consistent and sustained observation of psychiatric symptoms and cognitive limitations and creates an immersion in competency-related education, assessment of dangerousness requires more. Risk of dangerousness assessments rely on collateral information; record reviews; community, residential, and relationship considerations; substance use assessments; and functional analyses across situations. Because the BOP inpatient placements are often in a different state from a defendant's family and community, communication between the BOP evaluators/treaters and family may not occur, and knowledge about the community agencies and support systems are hard to assess from afar. Moreover, the BOP assessment and treatment units are designed to serve prisoners for whom questions of risk are related to prison safety and management, and release to the community is determined by courts.

The limited flexibility in placement for defendants with deficits significant enough to render them nonrestorable also raises the prospect of harm. In some cases, placements away from support and treatment networks may cause psychiatric exacerbations and setbacks in rehabilitation and recovery. A useful public policy consideration might be a change in regulations whereby the attorney general may order an independent forensic evaluation, addressing the best placement for determining both restorability and risk, thereby maximizing the opportunity for suitability on a case-by-case basis.