Is “Some” Enough in Special Education?

Facts of the Case

The IDEA provides federal education funds to state governments, provided that states make a FAPE available to all children with disabilities. The central mechanism by which the IDEA ensures a FAPE for each child is the development and implementation of an individualized education program (IEP), which is “a detailed written document which describes the student's educational goals for an academic year and establishes a plan to achieve those goals” (20 U.S.C.S. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2005)). The IEP “must be ‘reasonably calculated’ to enable the child to receive educational benefits” (Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 207 (1982)).

Endrew was diagnosed with autism at the age of two and was enrolled in special education classes in the local public school until the fourth grade when Endrew's parents identified that his progress had stalled and that his IEP was failing to help him progress toward his goals. Subsequently, his parents enrolled Endrew in a private school specializing in autism where he was documented to make social, behavioral, and academic progress. In accordance with the IDEA, Endrew's parents asserted the public school had not provided Endrew a FAPE and sought tuition reimbursement.

The case was first heard by an administrative law judge who denied the complaint and denied reimbursement. Endrew's parents appealed and sought judicial review in the Federal District Court of Colorado. The district court's standard for the IDEA compliance was that the state must provide only “some educational benefit,” and because Endrew had shown “at the least, minimal progress” (Endrew F., p 997), affirmed the prior finding.

Endrew's parents then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the decision of the district court, ruling that the standard for the IDEA, as interpreted by Rowley, required states to provide “merely more than de minimis” educational benefit to students. Endrew's parents then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Ruling and Reasoning

In a unanimous decision, the Court vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, holding that “to meet its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances” (Endrew F., p 999). The Court further held that the proper standard under the IDEA “is markedly more demanding than the ‘merely more than de minimis’ test applied by the Tenth Circuit” (Endrew F., p 1000). The Court contended that states should provide meaningful educational benefits to children with disabilities and not merely aim for more than de minimis progress.

In coming to its decision, the Court analyzed the context in which the IDEA was passed. Before the IDEA, children with disabilities were neither having their educational needs met, nor receiving adequate educational services to ensure full equality of opportunity. The purpose, therefore, was to ensure that children with disabilities received an adequate education and to promote equality. Thus, the Court rejected the notion that a statute designed to promote equal opportunity and effective educational efforts would simultaneously allow states to seek de minimis educational advancements for children with disabilities, finding that such a standard would make the IDEA's promises to students illusory and would frustrate Congressional intent.

The Court then reviewed Rowley, the case on which the Tenth Circuit based its decision. Amy Rowley was a deaf student whose school discontinued use of a sign language interpreter, even though it was listed in her IEP, after it was discovered she was a proficient lip reader. Ms. Rowley's parents filed suit contending that she was being deprived of an equal educational opportunity. It is notable that despite her handicap, Ms. Rowley was an above-average student, who scored better than her peers. Regardless, in this context, the Court held that public schools are not required by law to provide sign language interpreters to deaf students who are otherwise receiving an equal and adequate education. The Court thus established a standard that an IEP should be “reasonably calculated” to confer an educational benefit to the child, but also suggested that “appropriate progress” for most children would allow them to be fully integrated into the classroom and to advance from grade to grade.

The Court noted important differences between Rowley and the present case. First, Ms. Rowley, despite her disability, was fully integrated into a mainstream classroom, whereas for Endrew (and many other special-needs children), this was not possible. Second, as Ms. Rowley was an above-average student, the standards for measuring her progress differed significantly from that of many special-needs children, including Endrew. Therefore, the Court was faced with a new question: What do FAPE and IEPs look like for individuals who cannot perform at grade average? The Court ruled that “when a child is fully integrated in the regular classroom, providing a FAPE that meets the unique needs of a child with a disability (20 U.S.C.S. § 1401 (2005)) typically means providing a level of instruction reasonably calculated to permit advancement through the general curriculum,” but added a caveat that if smooth progress in the regular curriculum is not likely, a child's “IEP need not aim for grade-level advancement,” but “must be appropriately ambitious in light of his circumstances” (Endrew F., p 1000). The Court went one step further to state that an “appropriately ambitious” standard is “markedly more demanding than ‘merely more than de minimis’” (Endrew F., p 1000).

The Court further held that the inquiry into whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to allow a child to make progress is necessarily an intensive, fact-specific one and therefore neither the Court nor a statute could create a substantive standard. The Court went on to stipulate that, in conducting its fact-intensive inquiry, a reviewing court should give deference to the expertise of school authorities (Endrew F., p 999), but still ensure that “an IEP is reasonably calculated to enable each child to make progress appropriate for that child's circumstances” (Endrew F., p 1002).