Exclusion of Psychiatric Diagnosis and Substance Use in Consideration of Death Penalty Case Appeal

Facts of the Case

Mr. Rockwell was arrested and charged with murder after he fatally shot a store clerk, Daniel Rojas, during the robbery of a Valero gas station in Fort Worth, TX, on March 23, 2010. During his incarceration, Mr. Rockwell began exhibiting symptoms potentially suggestive of a mental illness. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia while incarcerated and was treated with haloperidol, an antipsychotic medication. During the litigation process, he was evaluated by several mental health professionals, including several psychologists and psychiatrists. Information obtained from these mental health evaluations, as well as from family members, friends, and acquaintances, pointed to either an intentional exaggeration of symptoms by Mr. Rockwell or a lack of symptoms supportive of the diagnosis of schizophrenia. In addition, Mr. Rockwell had a history of illegal steroid use, and his attorney retained the services of a forensic toxicologist. It was the opinion of this toxicologist that evidence of his steroid use should not be presented in court, as he stated that Mr. Rockwell's actions were not consistent with those that are typically seen in individuals who use steroids. In addition, his attorney did not wish to introduce evidence that could result in Mr. Rockwell's character being negatively perceived by the jury. Consequently, his attorney focused solely on Mr. Rockwell's character as a defense strategy by including 52 witnesses who testified on Mr. Rockwell's behalf when his sentence was being determined.

In 2012, Mr. Rockwell was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. An automatic direct appeal was submitted to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals claiming 21 points of error. The appeals court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mr. Rockwell filed a state and then a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus, both of which were denied.

Because federal law does not allow for an absolute right to appeal, a COA must first be granted by a circuit justice or judge (Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759(2017)). After his petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied by the federal courts, Mr. Rockwell filed a COA with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Among multiple claims, he argued that his trial counsel's failure to present evidence of his schizophrenia diagnosis and of his steroid use constituted ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In addition, he felt he was not eligible for the death penalty based on the precedent established in Atkins. Finally, he argued that Texas's death penalty statute unconstitutionally forbade juries from considering mitigating evidence.

Ruling and Reasoning

A COA is issued only if the circuit court judge determines that there has been “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” (28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2) (2017)). At the time of a COA inquiry, the question is solely whether the petitioner shows that “jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further” (Miler-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322(2003)). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Mr. Rockwell's COA application based on multiple prongs.

In his COA application, Mr. Rockwell claimed that his counsel had provided ineffective assistance, as they did not present evidence regarding his purported diagnosis of schizophrenia which caused him prejudice. In rejecting Mr. Rockwell's claim, the court reviewed information obtained over the course of litigation. This included evidence that Mr. Rockwell was exaggerating his symptoms and the diagnosis of schizophrenia was called into question by several mental health professionals. If the information regarding the initial diagnosis of schizophrenia had been introduced by his trial counsel, the evidence of possible malingering would also be discoverable. In addition, further potentially damaging information would have been discoverable, including the fact that Mr. Rockwell had once choked a woman, leaving her unconscious.

Mr. Rockwell also claimed ineffective assistance by counsel because evidence was not given regarding his illicit steroid use. The trial counsel retained a forensic toxicologist to evaluate the potential effects of his use of the drug. This expert advised that evidence regarding his steroid use should not be presented, as his use would not cause the violent act of which he was accused. In addition, Mr. Rockwell had procured these steroids illegally, and it was postulated that this behavior could be viewed negatively and contradict the positive character reports. Furthermore, although his counsel could have retained a more favorable expert, his counsel was not required to “shop for an expert” who would be more supportive of their claim (Perry v. Quarterman, 314 F. App'x 663 (5th Cir. 2009)). As a result, this aspect of Mr. Rockwell's COA was denied.

Mr. Rockwell also argued that, because of his proclaimed mental illness and in light of rulings in Atkins, he was not eligible for the death penalty. In Atkins, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that executing an individual with an intellectual disability (previously termed mental retardation) constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment; however, it does not comment on those diagnosed with mental illness in this prohibition. Furthermore, in Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 219 (5th Cir. 2014), it was stated that no previous federal rulings have determined the execution of mentally ill individuals to be unconstitutional. This case delineated the difference between executing the mentally ill and the insane. Thus, the court declined to extend the Atkins precedent to Mr. Rockwell's case.

Finally, Mr. Rockwell claimed that a Texas statute unconstitutionally bars juries from considering mitigating evidence that does not reduce a defendants “moral blameworthiness.” (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071, §2(f)(4) (West 2013)). The Fifth Circuit rejected this claim.