Refiling Charges on an Unrestored Defendant

Facts of the Case

Patrick Lowell Jackson was charged with felony sexual misconduct. The trial court found Mr. Jackson incompetent to stand trial, and he was ordered to receive treatment for restoration at a state hospital. Mr. Jackson did not regain competence within California's three-year statutory maximum period for involuntary commitment for a felony charge. He was returned to the trial court, and proceedings for civil conservatorship were initiated. However, Mr. Jackson did not meet criteria for conservatorship and was released from custody.

Three days later, the prosecution obtained a grand jury indictment for the identical charge for the identical alleged conduct, as permitted under Cal. Penal Code § 1387 (2013), and moved to dismiss the original complaint. Mr. Jackson was rearrested. A doubt as to his competence was raised again, and the criminal proceedings were again suspended.

Mr. Jackson did not have a second competency hearing, however, because the defense moved for Mr. Jackson's release, arguing that a defendant could not be confined in connection with refiled charges after already being committed for the maximum period, as per Cal. Penal Code § 1370 (2015) (all subsequent statutory references are to the Cal. Penal Code), for the identical alleged crime in the original complaint. The trial court denied the motion.

Mr. Jackson then filed a writ of mandate petition with the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The district court unanimously affirmed the trial court's decision. Further, the court urged the legislature to examine Cal. Penal Code § 1370 and to advise trial courts statewide on the options when faced with an incompetent defendant who has reached the maximum time for restoration.

Ruling and Reasoning

The California Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the district court. In its reasoning, the court first examined the “interaction between § 1387 and 1370” of the California Penal Code (Jackson, p 5). The “two-dismissal rule,” embodied in § 1387, protects the right to a speedy trial by prohibiting the repeated dismissal and refiling of charges. The court proceeded in its opinion by establishing that Mr. Jackson's felony complaint had been a qualifying dismissal per the two-dismissal rule, citing the associated state senate bill. “Existing law provides for a felony action to be refiled one time …. When the case is dismissed, the defendant is re-arrested, re-booked, a new case is filed, and the case processing begins anew” (Jackson, p 6, citing Sen. Com. Judiciary (1992)).

Next, the court reviewed Mr. Jackson's contention that his commitment for the maximum period allowed by law blocks further criminal proceedings for the refiled complaint. The court looked at legislative history and determined that the language of § 1387 does not exclude new competency hearings in the context of the renewed case and that the language of § 1370 does not exclude commitment following the competency hearing if it occurs “during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment” (Cal. Penal Code § 1368).

Moreover, the court said that Mr. Jackson could be recommitted after a new competency evaluation within constitutional principles of due process and equal protection. A defendant who regains competency following the maximum commitment statutory period should be returned to court (Cal. Penal Code § 1372). Similarly, Cal. Penal Code § 1370 provides that a defendant who regains competency during commitment should be returned to court to resume criminal proceedings; a defendant who does not regain competency during this time should be returned to court for consideration of a civil conservatorship and, if not made the subject of this conservatorship, should be released from custody.

Such rules for the proceedings of commitment in the state are the result of the California Supreme Court case, In re Davis, 5 P.2d 1018 (Cal. 1973) and the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Court in Jackson held that indefinite commitment is contrary to the constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. The Court also held that the duration of commitment may not exceed “the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that [the defendant] will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future” (Jackson v. Indiana, p 738). Accordingly, the duration of Patrick Jackson's commitment had been “reasonable” and constitutional as per the time limits in California, which had been adopted in In re Davis following Jackson v. Indiana.

Furthermore, in Jackson the Court held that the purpose of commitment is “solely on account of [the defendant's] incapacity to proceed to trial” (Jackson v. Indiana, p 738). Here, the California Supreme Court argued that a defendant who is rearrested on a refiled charge in accordance with Cal. Penal Code § 1387 is not being held for commitment. Instead, the defendant is being held pending admission to bail, which is not contrary to the rights protected by Cal. Penal Code § 1370. However, the court ruled that if the defendant is recommitted following a new competency hearing, then exceeding an aggregate duration of commitment would be contrary to the rights protected by “the rule of reasonableness.” The state concluded that the legislature did not intend Cal. Penal Code § 1370 to “constrain the ‘even-handed’ application of § 1387” (Jackson, p 787, quoting Crockett v. Superior Court, 5 P.2d 321, 326 (Cal. 1975)). In this case, Mr. Jackson could be lawfully subject to a new competency examination, but if found incompetent he could not be committed for restoration, given that he had already been committed for the maximum time in relation to the original complaint (In re Polk, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)) and thus remains protected within the established constitutional rights.

Finally, the state supreme court upheld the opinion of the lower court regarding rules for criminal proceedings when a defendant is still incompetent following the maximum commitment time and is not made the subject of a conservatorship: In the absence of such statutory language, [the] defendant relies on Jackson and Davis to support his contention that complete release from custody is the only outcome that can pass constitutional muster … however, he is trying to capitalize on the language to the effect … that he meets the conditions precedent to this rule (Jackson v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 247, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016)).

Thus, the California Supreme Court found nothing in the legislative history of Cal. Penal Code § 1370 to support Mr. Jackson's argument. The court held that a new competency hearing after dismissal of the original complaint and proceeding on a refiled complaint is allowed, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1387, even after an incompetent defendant has reached the maximum period of commitment conferred by § 1370. The authority of § 1387, however, cannot be used in a manner that violates constitutional rights. If a defendant, who had previously been committed for competency restoration, is rearrested on a refiled charge and again is found to be incompetent to stand trial, recommitment cannot exceed the remaining balance from the original commitment. The refiled charges and the ensuing arrest provide sufficient statutory basis for a new competency hearing.