Government Does Not Owe a Special Duty to Protect Citizen About Whom Report of Aberrant Behavior Was Made to Police
In McLaughlin v. City of Martinsburg, 2017 W. Va. LEXIS 638 (W. Va. 2017), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that there was no evidence of police negligence for failure to take Peter James McLaughlin into custody after emergency dispatchers received a report that he exhibited abnormal behavior at a local restaurant. The appeals court affirmed there was no evidence of a “special duty” doctrine owed by the state in the case of Mr. McLaughlin when police did not observe signs of mental distress after he was discharged from a psychiatric hospital.
Facts of the Case
Mr. McLaughlin voluntarily admitted himself to a local psychiatric hospital on or about December 22, 2013, in West Virginia. On December 28, 2013, Mr. McLaughlin requested to be discharged. According to his treating physician, he “appeared to be in control of his actions and was alert and completely oriented” (McLaughlin, p 2, FN 1). He denied any suicidal, self-harm, or homicidal ideation, nor did he appear to be responding to internal stimuli, and he was subsequently discharged. He started his journey on foot from the hospital to a local restaurant where an employee called police due to concern that Mr. McLaughlin exhibited psychotic behavior. The police arrived and met with Mr. McLaughlin. However, police stated that Mr. McLaughlin did not ask for help related to a mental illness, nor was there an indication of a medical emergency or crisis situation. Thus, he was not taken into police custody. Ms. McLaughlin (who was either Mr. McLaughlin's wife or former wife at the time of the incident), also called 911 requesting a safety check on Mr. McLaughlin by the police; however, officers were unable to locate him. Later that day, Mr. McLaughlin was struck and killed by a vehicle while walking along a public roadway.
In December 2014, Mr. McLaughlin's petitioner, Connor McLaughlin (as administrator of Peter McLaughlin's estate) filed a lawsuit against the City of Martinsburg alleging the city was negligent and that its negligence resulted in Mr. McLaughlin's death. In January 2016, the estate filed a motion for declaratory judgment contesting the standard responses by police in emergency situations and requesting that the circuit court declare that emergency dispatchers and officers need to treat individuals with a mental illness, bizarre behavior, or drug addiction behavior as a special class of citizen that may benefit from special services. The estate contended that the prevailing standard of police interaction was insufficient to protect special citizens and police should provide additional interventions when warranted.
In asserting that the city owed a special duty to protect Mr. McLaughlin, the estate noted that the state is “entitled to prevent a person from injuring himself … when it can be demonstrated that an individual … is so mentally ill that by sheer inactivity he will permit himself to die …. [T]hen the state is entitled to hospitalize him” (State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974), p 123).
The court denied the estate's motion to seek declaratory judgment and, in July 2016, the Circuit Court of Berkeley County granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Martinsburg, stating that the city is a political subdivision and is thus entitled to all protections and immunities under the purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act (W. Va. Code § 29–12A-1 (2013)). Further, the circuit court cited police protection from lawsuit under W. Va. Code § 29–12A-5(a)(5) (2013). The estate subsequently appealed that decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, leading to the present case.
Ruling and Reasoning
In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that the petitioner cannot prove negligence against the respondents and officers because there was no evidence that a special relationship existed between the local governmental entity and Mr. McLaughlin. The court upheld that the local governmental entity is immune from tort liability given that it is a political subdivision and police protection falls under a general duty to serve and protect the public, citing W. Va. Code § 29–12A-5(a)(5) (2013).
The court cited Benson v. Kutsch (380 S.E. 2d 36 (W. Va. 1989)) in positing that a lawsuit could be pursued if there were evidence that a special relationship existed between the local governmental entity and an individual. However, the court found no substantial evidence that a special relationship was established between emergency respondents and Mr. McLaughlin. Mr. McLaughlin did not seek assistance at the time he interacted with officers, did not exhibit any behavioral disturbances, and did not appear to be in a state of duress or under the influence of a substance or medication. Thus, the court noted, Mr. McLaughlin did not demonstrate any evidence of imminent danger to himself or others as described in Hawks. According to officers, Mr. McLaughlin's speech was coherent, and he provided law enforcement the name and telephone number of a friend who had apparently made arrangements to pick him up. The court found the estate did not support its claim that the city officers breached their constitutional and statutory duties.
Finally, the court rejected the estate's request for a jury determination rather than summary judgment to determine whether Mr. McLaughlin was in imminent danger, stating that his claim was “unprecedented” and referenced West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure, which states that the determination should be rendered by the court as a matter of law (W. Va. R.A.P. Rule 10(c)(7) (2013)). The court unanimously affirmed that there was no error in granting summary judgment to the City of Martinsburg on this ground or in denying the estate's motion for declaratory judgment.
Discussion
In May 2018, Mr. McLaughlin's estate also pursued litigation against the health care system and the attending psychiatrist who discharged him from the hospital. Ultimately, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's ruling to dismiss the case against the health care system and psychiatrist. Although this case focused primarily on police conduct, it also reflected legal considerations which are important for psychiatrists to consider when discharging a patient from the inpatient setting.
Over the past 50 years, there has been an evolution in the field's understanding of the criteria for which a patient can be involuntarily hospitalized. This standard has shifted from the parens patriae doctrine, where the “state protects those unable to protect and care for themselves,” to the standard of dangerousness to self or others (Wall B, Anfang S: Legal regulation of psychiatric treatment, in The American Psychiatric Association Publishing Textbook of Forensic Psychiatry. Edited by Gold LH, Frierson RL. Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association Publishing, 2018, p 134), to a civil commitment standard that focuses on the presence of dangerousness and/or grave disability (Simpson JR, Carannante V: Hospitalization: voluntary and involuntary, in Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry. Edited by Rosner R, Scott CL. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2017, p 126). Further, although police officers have significant discretion regarding if or when to take an individual into their custody, this dangerousness standard now often guides police officers' decisions to bring an individual to an emergency department for a psychiatric evaluation. This case highlights that the dangerousness model is the current standard for determining whether hospitalization or police intervention is warranted.
McLaughlin highlights the complexities involved in decisions about psychiatric admission and discharge and the balance of police power or parens patriae principles with individual autonomy. In this case, the estate explored the possibility of reclaiming the parens patriae doctrine to minimize harm via a model of beneficent paternalism in the state known for case law rejecting that doctrine in favor of the dangerousness model. Whether this pendulum might swing again toward the direction attempted by the estate remains to be seen.
- © 2019 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
