Bridgewater State Hospital Maintains the Authority to Hold a Defendant and File for Civil Commitment After a Defendant's Charges Have Been Dismissed
In In re E.C., 92 N.E.3d 724 (Mass. 2018), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that Bridgewater State Hospital could amend a petition for civil commitment and hold a defendant whose charges were dismissed but who remained in need of psychiatric hospitalization while the petition for civil commitment was pending. In making the decision, the justices considered the due process rights of criminal defendants as well as the interests of safety for the public and the individual.
Facts of the Case
E.C. was charged in the Boston Municipal Court with malicious destruction of property worth more than $250 in May 2012. After a psychologist testified that E.C. was not competent to stand trial in July 2012, he was transferred to Bridgewater State Hospital for further competency evaluation. In August 2012, the judge ordered that E.C. return to Bridgewater for a 35-day hospitalization after Bridgewater reported that E.C. was not competent to stand trial. Then Bridgewater petitioned the court to commit E.C. for a six-month period of treatment as authorized by Massachusetts law, which was granted.
Before the end of the six-month commitment period, Bridgewater filed a petition in the Brockton Division of the District Court Department for a one-year extension of the commitment of E.C., in accordance with Massachusetts law. One week before the scheduled hearing, E.C. filed a motion to dismiss his criminal charge, which was granted. Bridgewater was not informed about the dismissal until six days later. Bridgewater thereafter immediately filed a motion to amend its original petition to a petition for civil commitment under a separate provision of Massachusetts law.
Bridgewater reasoned that the law allowed for civil commitment of defendants whose charges had been dismissed. E.C. opposed the motion, reasoning that dismissal of his criminal charge ended his original commitment order. The judge denied Bridgewater's motion to amend, finding that the hospital could not detain E.C. after dismissal of his criminal charges. Furthermore, the judge ruled that the hospital did not have the authority to begin civil commitment proceedings since E.C. could no longer be considered a patient at Bridgewater after dismissal of his criminal charges. E.C. was discharged from Bridgewater in March 2013.
Bridgewater filed a motion for reconsideration by the district court, which was denied in March 2013. The Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed that decision in November 2013. The appeals court reversed that decision in August 2016. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts then reviewed the matter.
Ruling and Reasoning
To reach its decision, the court aimed to determine the legislature's intent in passing the law allowing for one-year extensions of the initial six-month commitment, given that the statute “does not address the procedure to follow if criminal charges are dismissed while a petition for recommitment is pending” (E.C., p 732). The court examined the history of the statute, which was intended to protect individuals with mental illness from being confined to psychiatric hospitals for years without review. The statute guaranteed a process of regular review in attempting to balance the rights of the incompetent mentally ill with “the Commonwealth's interest in ‘protecting the public from potentially dangerous persons’ who may be unable to control their actions because of their mental condition” (E.C., p 730, citing Commonwealth v. Calvaire, 66 N.E.3d 1028 (Mass. 2017)). The court concluded that this review process would not be violated by Bridgewater's amended petition, since a hearing would be held within 14 days of the filing of the new petition.
Even with dismissal of E.C.'s criminal charges, the court felt that Bridgewater had the statutory authority to hold him under the provision which allows Bridgewater to retain an individual while a petition for civil commitment is pending. They also looked to other statutes for guidance, such as the provision that grants authority to the medical director of Bridgewater to petition the district court for commitment of any individual “when it is determined that the failure to hospitalize in strict security would create a likelihood of serious harm by reason of mental illness” (Mass. Gen. Law ch. 123, § 7 (b) (2012)). Furthermore, they noted that, while the statute provides a timeline for dismissal of criminal charges for defendants who are incompetent to stand trial, “it does not state … that the person immediately must be released from commitment” after dismissal of the charges (E.C., p 731).
The court also reasoned that E.C.'s understanding of the statute was inconsistent with the understanding illustrated in Massachusetts law that untried defendants may require further hospitalization for treatment after dismissal of criminal charges.
Furthermore, the court disagreed with E.C.'s argument that Bridgewater's authority to hold him pending a hearing on its motion to amend was a violation of due process. The court pointed out that Bridgewater was required to provide the incompetent individual with notice and a hearing, and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the requirements articulated by the legislature for civil commitment to Bridgewater. The court found that none of the due process protections would be violated by Bridgewater pursuing a petition for commitment under the civil procedures rather than under the one-year extensions under the criminal procedures.
The court concluded that the judge abused her discretion in declining to allow Bridgewater to amend its petition and reversed the judgment.
Discussion
The question of how long, and on what basis, a hospital can hold a competency restoration patient after criminal charges have been dismissed is of great relevance to forensic psychiatrists and mental health policy makers. Concern for clarifying the mental health policy implications of the portion of the Massachusetts statute that deals with competency restoration proceedings formed the basis of Bridgewater State Hospital's decision to pursue the appeals process for this case (O'Donnell E, counsel for Bridgewater, personal communication, August 2018).
Without the process clarified, the hospital ran the risk, on the one hand, of violating civil liberties if it was legally improper to continue hospitalizing a defendant whose criminal charges have been dismissed. On the other hand, discharging defendants simply because of the dismissal of the criminal charge(s) that brought them to the attention of authorities but who still met criteria for civil commitment could put the safety of the public and the individual at risk. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned in this case that the statutory language supported the continued retention of such a defendant and that the interests of public safety and the potential need for defendants to receive ongoing mental health treatment after criminal charges are dropped outweigh concerns about the restriction of civil liberties involved in an involuntary hospitalization, especially because civil commitment proceedings and incompetency to stand trial proceedings involve the same due process rights protections.
In balancing due process considerations with concerns about risk to the public, there are often several factors that must be considered, including severity of illness, nature of the crime, and risk of recidivism. How these factors are weighed may vary based on whether the hospitalization is pursued for purposes of involuntary commitment or competency restoration. In their discussion of the case, the justices opined, “When criminal charges are dismissed, the government's interest in protecting the individual and the public remains, but the calculus is different,” shifting from competency restoration toward safety of the individual and the public (E.C., p 730). The court's decision affirmed the authority of the hospital to file petitions according to its judgment of a patient's risk, rather than be forced to discharge an individual as soon as criminal charges were dismissed.
Even though E.C. asserted that there was a gap in the statute, a plain face reading of the statue did not suggest this conclusion. It would be prudent for hospital administrators faced with a similar situation to examine what guidance their own state statutes give about responding to such situations.
- © 2019 American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law
