When Dangerousness and Credibility Are Central Issues to a Civil Case, Shackling Without Specific Justification Violates Due Process
In Claiborne v. Blauser, 928 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's denial of a California prisoner's motion for a new trial in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit. The plaintiff argued for a new trial because he was shackled without justification during his three-day trial about two corrections officers' alleged use of excessive force. The appellate court held that the district court erred in allowing the plaintiff to be shackled based solely on his status as a convicted prisoner, without considering the specific risks that he posed in the courtroom.
Facts of the Case
On May 3, 2010, Dennis Claiborne, a 63-year-old man serving a sentence of 60 years to life at High Desert State Prison in California, was admonished by corrections officers for socializing with other inmates while waiting in line for his medication. When Officers Blauser and Martin ordered Mr. Claiborne to stay in his cell for the remainder of the day, Mr. Claiborne asked to speak with their supervisor to contest his punishment. The officers agreed to transport him to the sergeant's office.
The parties gave substantially different accounts of what happened next. Mr. Claiborne, who had mobility limitations and had previously undergone a knee replacement, claimed that he was acting respectfully when he was asked to “cuff up.” He immediately complied with the request but asked for waist chains because he would have difficulty using his cane with handcuffs. Instead, the two officers supported Mr. Claiborne by holding him up at his arms and transported him across the prison yard. Because the terrain of the yard was uneven and the officers were moving too quickly, Mr. Claiborne's leg hyperextended, causing him to become unsteady. At first the officers told Mr. Claiborne not to resist. When this occurred a second time, he was pulled to the ground. He claimed the officers jumped on his right side and knee, pulled his hair, and punched him in his face. In the years following the event, he suffered additional injuries to his knee, including a failed right knee arthroplasty.
According to the officers, Mr. Claiborne became agitated after they counseled him for lingering in line. Officer Blauser told Mr. Claiborne to “cuff up” because she did not feel safe. The officers also claimed that Mr. Claiborne did not make any requests about needing waist chains. Officer Martin took Mr. Claiborne's cane, and the two officers escorted him across the yard while supporting him at his arms. They opted to take the most direct path across the yard instead of along the paved path. The officers claimed that Mr. Claiborne attempted to break away in the middle of the prison yard. When they asked him not to resist, Mr. Claiborne continued to act aggressively. When he attempted to break away a second time, Officer Blauser said she pulled Mr. Claiborne to the ground but denied pulling his hair or punching him in the face.
Mr. Claiborne sued Officers Blauser and Martin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), along with several other prison staff, for multiple claims including battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Many of these claims were eventually dismissed. The case proceeded to trial on two claims: that Officers Blauser and Martin used excessive force against Mr. Claiborne, and that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, violating his Eighth Amendment rights.
Mr. Claiborne's trial lasted three days, and he appeared in court in foot shackles throughout the proceeding. At no point during his trial did Mr. Claiborne object to the shackles, nor did the court note any particular justification for their use. The jury reached a verdict in favor of the officers on both claims. Subsequently, Mr. Claiborne filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that he should not have been visibly shackled during the trial without a judicial determination that the restraints were necessary. The district court denied his motion, reasoning that it was unlikely the jury ever saw his restraints and that the jury had already been informed he was a prisoner (Claiborne v. Blauser, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116710 (E.D. Cal. 2016)). In addition, the court noted that shackles would have been ordered even if Mr. Claiborne had objected during the trial because he was a convicted prisoner serving a lengthy sentence, and therefore any error arising from the court's failure to consider the question contemporaneously was harmless. Mr. Claiborne appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Ruling and Reasoning
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied on previous appellate decisions, which clearly stated that shackles cannot be used routinely in either criminal or civil proceedings. The court cited Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), a U.S. Supreme Court case highlighting three fundamental legal principles that are undermined by the use of visible restraints. First, visible restraints undercut the presumption of innocence because they suggest that a defendant needs to be restrained. Second, restraints can interfere with defendants' ability to communicate with counsel and participate fully in their defense. Third, restraints violate the formal dignity of judicial proceedings, which includes respectful treatment of defendants. The court noted that the prohibition against routine visible shackling applies even when the presumption of innocence does not, including in civil commitment hearings and during the sentencing phase of capital cases. Citing a similar Seventh Circuit case in which a convicted prisoner sued corrections officials, the court stated that the appearance of a civil plaintiff in handcuffs and leg irons “suggested to the jury that the plaintiff was dangerous and violent, so that whatever force the guards had used was probably necessary …” (Claiborne, p 805, citing Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354 (1993)).
The court concluded that visible shackling violates due process unless a case-by-case justification is established, steps are taken to mitigate prejudice, and less restrictive alternatives are considered.
Because Mr. Claiborne's dangerousness and credibility were key elements at trial, the court concluded that he was denied a fair proceeding when he was allowed to appear in shackles without determining a sufficient need for such restraints. The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's opinion that, even if a hearing on the matter had been held, the shackles would have been ordered because of Mr. Claiborne's status as a convicted prisoner. The court concluded that merely being a convicted prisoner is insufficient to warrant shackling, and “compelling circumstances” such as flight risk or problematic behavior in the courtroom must also be present. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had plainly erred in allowing Mr. Claiborne to be shackled. The district court's decision was reversed and remanded, with the advisement that the lower court could impose shackles during Mr. Claiborne's new trial, but only after a full hearing and the consideration of less restrictive alternatives.
Discussion
In this decision, the Ninth Circuit cited cases from multiple jurisdictions over the past three decades that established a trend away from routine shackling during legal proceedings where an individual's credibility and dangerousness are questions the jury must decide, such as in criminal trials, civil commitment proceedings, prisoner lawsuits against corrections officials, and even death penalty cases. More recently, professional organizations and advocacy groups have agreed with this trend, particularly for juveniles. For example, in 2015, both the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and the Child Welfare League of America developed position statements against the shackling of juveniles (Mandatory Shackling in Juvenile Court Settings, available at: https://www.aacap.org/aacap/policy_statements/2015/mandatory_shackling_in_juvenile_court_settings.aspx, accessed September 1, 2019; CWLA Policy Statement: Juvenile Shackling, available at: https://www.cwla.org/cwla-policy-statement-juvenile-shackling, accessed September 1, 2019), stating that children should be restrained only in extraordinary circumstances.
It is interesting to note that all of these groups seem to take for granted that visible shackles have the potential to bias jurors against the person who wears them. From a scientific perspective, very little evidence supports this conclusion. To our knowledge, no studies have directly addressed the link between shackles and juror bias. Studies of related questions, such as the effects of a defendant's dress on simulated jurors, have noted that institutional attire has a negative impact on perceptions of the defendant's character (Etemad M: To Shackle or Not to Shackle? The Effect of Shackling on Judicial Decision-Making. Rev Law Soc Just 28: 368–70, 2019). These investigations were completed decades ago, however, and it is not clear whether their conclusions still apply in a contemporary context because societal attitudes about attire have shifted significantly. Some may argue that the link between shackles and juror bias is simply common sense, but further investigation could help to clarify this important topic.
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