Religious Rights in the Criminal Justice System

Facts of the Case

Bobby Brown, a Muslim inmate, initiated a class action lawsuit against the executive director of the TDCJ, resulting in a 1977 consent decree. Prior to the consent decree, when more than four inmates attended a religious activity, direct in-room supervision by either TDCJ staff or an outside volunteer was required. The consent decree made a special exception that granted Muslim inmates the right to religious practice under indirect supervision; this meant that a staff employee or volunteer was not required to be in the room, as long as an officer was monitoring the activity. The consent decree also provided that Muslim inmates be allowed equal time for religious practices in relation to other religions.

In 2009, William Scott, a Jehovah's Witness, filed a lawsuit against the director of TDCJ. The lawsuit requested injunctive relief directing prison officials to allow Jehovah's Witnesses to hold regularly scheduled meetings with or without a volunteer, similar to the privilege extended to Muslim inmates. The district court held in Scott v. Pierce, 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 190126 (S.D. Tex. 2012), that the Establishment Clause requires “denominational neutrality” and that a “prohibition against preferential treatment of religion is ‘absolute’” (Brown, p 225). The district court found that, under current practices, Muslim inmates “are preferred to Jehovah's Witnesses with respect to the volunteer policy” (Brown, p 225) and ordered the Executive Director of TDCJ to propose a method of compliance. TDCJ responded with Administrative Directive AD-07.30 (rev. 7) (June 30, 2014) (hereafter Scott Plan), which stated that all religious gatherings of more than four inmates required direct supervision, including Muslim inmates, and that religious groups may have one hour of directly supervised activity each week. The new Scott Plan contradicted the 1977 consent decree, and the TDCJ moved to terminate the 1977 consent decree pursuant to the PLRA.

The district court held a hearing on TDCJ's motion to dissolve the 1977 consent decree. The district court concluded that two provisions remained necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of the U.S. Constitution: it required TDCJ officials to allow Muslim inmates equal time for worship compared with other religions, and allowed religious services under the supervision of an inmate leader. The district court found that one hour of direct supervision per week did not allow enough time for Muslims to meet the requirements of their religious practice, that the number of Muslim chaplains and available volunteers were insufficient, and that TDCJ did not assign Muslim inmates to specifically designated units to facilitate religious activities (as was done with other religions).

The district court held that TDCJ's Scott Plan violated the Establishment Clause because the policy resulted in Muslim inmates being able to participate in religious activities for only one hour per week, whereas inmates of other religions had access to six or more hours of religious activities per week. The district court further found that the policy violated the Free Exercise Clause because it did not relate to a legitimate penological purpose and restricted Islamic religious exercise, and that the policy violated the inmates' rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 2 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq (2000), because it substantially burdened their religious exercise and it did not serve a compelling governmental interest (Brown v. Livingston, 17 F. Supp. 3d 616 (S.D. Tex. 2014)). TDCJ appealed the district court's denial of its motion to terminate the consent decree.

Ruling and Reasoning

In the ruling, Judge Owen noted that the consent decree does not remain necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, or the Establishment Clause. The Fifth Circuit found that TDCJ's motion to vacate the consent decree should have been granted, terminated the consent decree, and vacated the award of attorneys' fees. The Fifth Circuit indicated the PLRA strongly disfavors continuing relief through the federal courts and does not authorize the district court to expand the consent decree. The inquiry under the PLRA was whether there was an ongoing violation of a federal right.

Applying precedent from Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004), and Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007), the Fifth Circuit asserted that it was not the Scott Plan that imposed a burden on the Muslim inmates' religious exercise; rather, it was the lack of volunteers. The Fifth Circuit said, as in Adkins, that Muslims had alternative means of exercising their religious rights. Reviewing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), the Fifth Circuit applied the standard of review set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and noted it did not agree with the district court that TDCJ's direct supervision requirement failed Turner's rationality review and violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Fifth Circuit found that direct supervision of inmate religious gatherings of more than four individuals had legitimate government interests, including safety and security in prisons. The Fifth Circuit further reasoned that the assignment of some Jewish and Native American inmates to particular units did not support the conclusion that they had greater access to chaplains, volunteers, or religious activities. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the consent decree did not remain necessary to correct current and ongoing violations of the Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and RLUIPA.