Proper Standards for a Faretta Inquiry

Facts of the Case

Sylvester Hooks was charged with two counts of possession of drugs with intent to distribute, as well as violation of his probation. Prior to jury selection and trial, Mr. Hooks requested to proceed without counsel. The trial judge provided him with a document containing instructional material on self-representation. The judge later inquired as to whether he had read the document. Mr. Hooks affirmed that he had. The judge also warned Mr. Hooks of the dangers of proceeding pro se and reminded him that the decision to proceed without legal representation must be made “knowingly and voluntarily.” Mr. Hooks reaffirmed his decision and signed and initialed the provided document, which was accepted by the trial judge. Mr. Hooks represented himself during jury selection. At the onset of his trial, four days later, the judge inquired for a third time whether Mr. Hooks wished to proceed pro se. At trial, Mr. Hooks was found guilty on all counts. During the sentencing phase of his trial, now represented by counsel, Mr. Hooks was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Mr. Hooks appealed to a state appellate court, stating that Faretta provided factors that the court must consider when determining if the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. Mr. Hooks asserted that the trial court did not inquire about his “age, education, mental or physical health, ability to read and write, drug use, or prior self-representation” and that, consequently, the trial court had conducted an inadequate Faretta evaluation (Hooks, p 165).

The state appeals court rejected Mr. Hooks' claim of an improper Faretta colloquy because the Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d) (3) (2019) did not require specific questions to be asked to ensure that a Faretta inquiry was adequate. The appeals court stated that, to satisfy Faretta, the trial court is only required to ensure that the “defendant is competent to waive counsel” and that the defendant “understands its advice regarding the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” (Hooks v. State, 236 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017), p 1127). Because the trial judge had repeatedly cautioned Mr. Hooks about the potential disadvantage of proceeding pro se, and his legal competence was not in question, the appellate court concluded that, at least per rule 3.111(d) (3), the Faretta examination was adequate.

The state appellate court was concerned about a group of Florida Supreme Court cases that might conflict with the most recent versions of rule 3.111(d) (3). In Aguirre-Jarquin v. State, 9 So. 3d 593 (Fla. 2009)), and later in McGirth v. State, 209 So. 3d 1146 (2017)), the state supreme court concluded that certain factors should be reviewed to inform a court's decision as to whether to allow a defendant to proceed without legal representation. The Aguirre-Jarquin and McGirth courts identified factors such as a defendant's age, experience, and understanding of criminal procedure, which they held must be considered to render a request to proceed pro se as knowing and voluntary. The appellate court concluded that the Aguirre-Jarquin and McGirth decisions might have been misinterpreted and did not necessarily contradict rule 3.111(d) (3) or Faretta. The appellate court reasoned that the Aguirre-Jarquin court found the Faretta inquiry to be satisfactory even when the trial court had not catalogued the questions that supported the court's conclusion. But, to address possible issues raised by the appellate court's review of Aguirre-Jarquin, they certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, inquiring as to whether the Faretta inquiry in Hooks was adequate, without review of the specific factors mentioned in Aguirre-Jarquin.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that a Faretta colloquy is not rendered inadequate when the trial court accepted a request for a defendant to proceed pro se and did not ascertain the defendant's age, experience, and understanding of the rules of criminal procedure, including the ability to prepare a defense and technical legal knowledge.

The state supreme court detailed the history of rule 3.111(d) (3), noting that the original version was promulgated three years prior to the Faretta decision. In the pre-Faretta edition of rule 3.111(d) (3), a waiver of legal representation would not be accepted if the defendant was unable to make an “intelligent and understanding choice” due to his “mental condition, age, education, experience, the nature and complexity of the case, or other factors” (Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d) (3) (Fla. 1972)). But the U.S. Supreme Court held in Faretta that a defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation if “knowingly and intelligently” deciding to proceed pro se. The Court stated that the reasoning supporting the petitioner's decision could be imperfect, but the petitioner should be informed of the risks of waiving counsel. The courts in Florida continued to rely on the pre-Faretta version of rule 3.111(d) (3). After Faretta, the Florida Supreme Court aligned with and reflected the decision in Faretta when it reversed a trial court's decision to deny a defendant's right to waive legal counsel because of his educational history in State v. Bowen, 698 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1997). In 1998, in response to Bowen, rule 3.111(d) (3) was revised to reflect the defendant's right to represent himself if the court determines that the defendant made a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of the right to counsel. Following Bowen and the revision of rule 3.111(d) (3), the state supreme court emphasized that defendants' understanding of their legal rights, not their legal or technical knowledge or the identification of specific factors, was relevant when trial courts review petitioners' right to waive counsel.

The Florida Supreme Court noted that Aguirre-Jarquin suggested consideration of factors that influence a decision as to whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. These factors were drawn from its own opinion in Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2001), but Porter only stated that those factors may be considered. Porter held that even if the factors were not considered, this did not necessarily suggest an inadequate Faretta inquiry. The Florida Supreme Court held that trial courts did not err by mere failure to consider factors outlined in Aguirre-Jarquin. The court concluded that a defendant should be permitted to waive the assistance of counsel following a thorough inquiry into the defendant's comprehension of the request.