Competence to Be Executed

Facts of the Case

In 1977, Deana Bowdoin was found dead in her apartment after having been strangled and stabbed, with semen on her person and clothing. The crime remained unsolved until 2001, when DNA recovered from the scene was found to be a match for Clarence Wayne Dixon. In 1977, Mr. Dixon had been found not guilty by reason of insanity for assault with a deadly weapon in an unrelated case. In 1985, Mr. Dixon was convicted of aggravated assault, kidnapping, sexual abuse, and four counts of sexual assault in another unrelated case. He received consecutive life sentences for each count. Mr. Dixon's DNA was obtained in the preceding investigation.

In 2002, Mr. Dixon was charged in Ms. Bowdoin’s homicide. During the trial, Mr. Dixon wished to mount a defense predicated on the notion that his DNA had been illegally obtained. Defense counsel disagreed with this strategy, and Mr. Dixon chose to represent himself. At the time, Mr. Dixon denied having mental health conditions. In 2008, Mr. Dixon was convicted of premeditated murder and felony murder, and he was sentenced to death.

Mr. Dixon appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the decision. He also filed habeas petitions. The trial court rejected his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of failing to adequately address competence at the time of this trial, and the court specifically found that Mr. Dixon was rational, had cogent thoughts, and was able to adequately advance his positions.

Mr. Dixon's execution was scheduled for May 11, 2022. On April 8, 2022, he requested a hearing in Arizona state court regarding his competency to be executed. Expert witness testimony was presented, and the Arizona Superior Court ruled that Mr. Dixon had not proved that he was incompetent to be executed.

The Arizona Supreme Court declined to review the decision. On May 9, 2022, Mr. Dixon filed a federal habeas petition regarding the competency determination and a motion to stay his execution. The petition was denied by the district court and the Ninth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit based its reasoning for its decision on 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2009), which stated that a federal habeas petition would not be granted unless the state court proceedings “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

The Ninth Circuit referred to Madison v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2019), and held that the question regarding competency to be executed was “whether the prisoner can rationally understand the reasons for his death sentence.” The Ninth Circuit held that the state court's determination that Mr. Dixon met this standard for competence was consistent with the requirements in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, affirmed the state court's decision, and denied Mr. Dixon's motion for a stay of execution.

The Ninth Circuit rejected Mr. Dixon's argument that the Arizona state court's decision that he was competent to be executed was an unreasonable application of established law. The court referenced prior case law. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the “Eighth Amendment prohibits the state from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane” (Ford, p 410). In Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), the Supreme Court held that insanity by this standard was determined by whether “mental illness deprives him of the mental capacity to understand that he is being executed as a punishment for a crime” (Panetti, p 954). The Ninth Circuit reviewed findings of the Arizona Supreme Court and determined that the state court had correctly applied the legal standard in determining whether Mr. Dixon had a “rational understanding” of the reason for his sentence.

The Ninth Circuit found that the Arizona Supreme Court had noted that Mr. Dixon had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, but found that his mental disorder alone did not render him incompetent for execution. The state court observed that Mr. Dixon had “high-average” intelligence and that his pleadings suggested “coherent and organized thinking.” The state's expert witness, Dr. Carlos Vega, noted that Mr. Dixon had made the statement that “if he had a memory of the murder, he would have a sense of relief on his way to his execution” (Dixon, p 1055). The court interpreted this statement as evidence that Mr. Dixon understood that he had been sentenced to death as punishment for a crime. Dr. Vega did not find Mr. Dixon to be delusional and provided further evidence that he understood the reasons for his sentence, including statements by Mr. Dixon that he wished he lived in a state without the death penalty, that he did not want to die, and that he would bring the victim back to life if he could.

Mr. Dixon had also indicated to his expert, Dr. Lauro Amezcua-Patiño, that the state wanted to execute him for murder. Both experts agreed that Mr. Dixon knew why he was being executed but disagreed on the question of competence. Mr. Dixon also argued that the state court had not considered his delusion that his conviction was invalid because he believed the DNA evidence had been obtained improperly. The court rejected this argument citing the logic in Madison that not all delusions interfere with the required level of understanding.

The Ninth Circuit also rejected Mr. Dixon's claim that the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Mr. Dixon argued that the state court was unreasonable in not accepting the conclusions of Dr. Amezcua-Patiño that he was incompetent. The Ninth Circuit held that it was not unreasonable for the state court to accept that Mr. Dixon had schizophrenia but retained a rational understanding of the reasons for his sentence. Mr. Dixon found fault with some aspects of Dr. Vega's assessment, including the interview's length, that it was not recorded, was conducted via video, and did not consider his neuropsychological test results. The court denied that these supposed flaws rendered the state court's conclusion that Mr. Dixon was competent to be unreasonable.