Jailer's Special Duty of Care in Inmate's Suicide Negligence-Based Claims

Facts of the Case

In December 1995, Edward Gregoire was arrested by State Trooper Harry Nelson on outstanding misdemeanor warrants. Mr. Gregoire was violent during his arrest and transport to jail. On arrival, he momentarily tried to escape, was caught, and was restrained. He reportedly screamed, “Why don't you shoot me?” Eventually he was put in leg restraints and hit to stop him from kicking. He calmed down and was placed in a regular jail cell by himself. His mental and physical condition was not screened by jail officials. He was seen crying within minutes after he was placed in a regular jail cell. Approximately 10 minutes later, he was found hanging from a bed sheet. As soon as the jail officers noticed, they cut him loose and called for help. CPR was performed by paramedics, but he was pronounced dead shortly after getting to the hospital.

In 1998, Ms. Tanya Gregoire, as guardian ad litem for Mr. Edward Gregoire's minor child, Brianna Gregoire, brought a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. She filed claims based on 42 U.S. § 1983, as well as state claims of negligence and wrongful death. The court dismissed all federal claims and did not accept jurisdiction on the remaining state claims.

In 2002, Ms. Gregoire filed suit in the Island County Superior Court for wrongful death, negligence, constitutional violations, and civil rights claims. That court dismissed her state constitutional claims as well as the negligence claims, but agreed to hear the wrongful-death claim. At trial in 2006, the court allowed the city of Oak Harbor (the defendant) to assert the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Over Ms. Gregoire's objection, the jury was instructed on these defenses. The jury found that the city was negligent but was not liable for damages, because its negligence was not the proximate cause of Mr. Gregoire's death. Instead, it found that Mr. Gregoire's own actions were the intervening proximate cause of his death, thus absolving the city of any liability.

Ms. Gregoire appealed to the state court of appeals, arguing that the special relationship between jailer and inmate creates an affirmative duty of care owed by the city that cannot be delegated to the inmate; thus, the assumption-of-risk defense did not apply. The court of appeals agreed that there was a special relationship, but, noting that Ms. Gregoire had not cited any authority for her claim, affirmed the lower court's jury findings (Gregoire v. City of Oak Harbor, No. 58544-4-I (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)).

Ms. Gregoire then petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review to determine if the jury instructions were inappropriate and resulted in prejudicial error. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals decision and remanded the case for a new trial.

Ruling and Reasoning

In this case of first impression, the Washington Supreme Court held that jailers have a special relationship with their inmates. The court reasoned that because inmates are deprived of their liberty, it becomes the duty of the jailer to care for their health, safety, and welfare. The court further held that the duty owed is a special affirmative duty to the inmate, one that is nondelegable. This, the court held, bars any assumption-of-risk defense (Gregoire, p 927). It noted that there are state and federal requirements that jailers protect inmates' health, welfare, and safety. It noted, too, that state administrative regulations require Washington jails to perform suicide screenings and to use suicide-prevention programs.

The court discussed the doctrine of the assumption of risk and explained its subtypes: express, implied primary, implied unreasonable, and implied reasonable. It noted that assumption of risk that is express or implied primary relieves the defendant of all liability. If allowed and proven in this instance, it would mean that Mr. Gregoire had consented to relieve the jail of its duty to him.

At trial, Oak Harbor was allowed to argue implied primary assumption of risk, and the trial jury was instructed concerning Oak Harbor's claims that Mr. Gregoire was contributorily negligent and had assumed the risk of death when he hanged himself, thus making his own conduct the proximate cause of his death. The supreme court held that these instructions were legally erroneous because they allowed the defendant city to abrogate its nondelegable duty.

The supreme court regarded the question of whether the scope of a jailer's duty of care to an inmate extends to liability for self-harm inflicted by the inmate as a matter of first impression. In deciding this question in the affirmative, the court turned to several sources. It noted that some other state supreme courts had decided that the special duty of care owed by a caretaker to a detainee could not be delegated to the detainee, citing, for example, Sauders v. County of Steuben, 693 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. 1998). The court also cited as analogous precedent two Washington cases: Christensen v. Royal School Dist. No. 160, 124 P.3d 283 (Wash. 2005), and Hunt v. King County, 481 P.2d 593 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).

In Sauders the Indiana Supreme Court barred the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence in a jail suicide case. In Hunt, the appeals court upheld the negligence claim against a hospital for its failure to protect a patient from injuries sustained in an attempted suicide. The Hunt court held that there is a duty to safeguard a detained patient from the reasonably foreseeable occurrence of self-harm, whether the self-harm is volitional or negligent. In Christensen, a school district's defense of contributory negligence was barred as inappropriate against a 13-year-old student's claim of sexual abuse by her teacher. The Gregoire court held that the jury's finding that the city's negligence was not the proximate cause of the inmate's death was likely the result of jury instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of risk. Since these instructions were erroneous, given the jailer's continuing duty to protect, they led to prejudice against the plaintiff.

The dissent, while acknowledging the special relationship between jailer and inmate, argued that there is no absolute duty to protect inmates from self-harm. It stressed that the purpose of incarceration is not to treat or prevent self-inflicted harm and that inmates have a duty of self-care (Gregoire, p, 933). Noting each person's duty of self care, the dissent construed suicide as a voluntary, willful choice determined by a moderate intellect that knows the power and the physical effect of the suicidal act. The dissent cited Webstad v. Stortini, 924 P.2d 940, 945 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), which held that the mere existence of the special relationship does not guarantee the safety of the plaintiff. Arguing this, the Gregoire dissent cited Yurkovich v. Rose, 847 P.2d 925 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), where a 13-year-old girl was killed while crossing a highway, shortly after exiting a school bus. Although the bus driver had a special relationship and owed a duty and although his negligence created the risk of harm, the court approved the jury instructions allowing for consideration of the student's contributory negligence.