The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006: Civil Commitment and Supervised Release for Sexually Dangerous Persons

Facts of the Case

As outlined in the United States Code Service (U.S.C.S) § 4248, the federal government may pursue the civil commitment of a sexually dangerous person who is in federal custody if there are dangers associated with that individual's release from custody. As outlined in 18 U.S.C.S. § 4247(a)(6), a person is defined as “sexually dangerous to others” if he “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” This statute faced constitutional challenges but ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court (United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) ruled that Article I of the Constitution granted sufficient authority for Congress to enact § 4248. Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that requiring the state to bear the burden of proof under § 4248 by the standard of “clear and convincing evidence” rather than the more stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” did not transgress the due process rights of the Fifth Amendment (United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513 (4th Cir. 2010).

Procedurally, the statute provides that, before civil commitment proceedings are sanctioned pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. § 4248, an authorized official must first certify the respondent as a sexually dangerous person. Once a § 4248 certification is filed, the respondent's release from custody is stayed pending completion of the certification procedures. Procedures include a psychiatric or psychological examination of the respondent pursuant to § 4248(b), if such an examination is ordered by the district court, in addition to a hearing pursuant to § 4247(d). Once the procedures are carried forth, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a sexually dangerous person, the respondent is committed to the custody of the attorney general. The individual is committed until he is “no longer sexually dangerous to others” (§ 4248(d)).

The nine respondent prisoners, all of whom were incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute at Butner, North Carolina (FCI-Butner), for sexual offenses, had been given sentences that included supervised release following incarceration. The government instituted § 4248 civil commitment proceedings just before their scheduled supervised release. Pursuant to § 4248(a), by these certifications being filed, the respondents' releases from custody were stayed. Although the respondents were entitled to both hearings as well as rulings on the merits of their § 4248 certifications, because of the pending resolution of the constitutional issues brought forth in the Comstock litigation, none of the respondents was initially granted hearings. After the Appeals Court decision in Comstock, the district court submitted a standing order indicating that the respondents could in fact request merits hearings on their certifications. At that point, each of the respondents filed a motion to dismiss his § 4248 commitment proceeding. The respondents alleged that their terms of supervised release provided adequate safeguards to the public, and as such, the § 4248 certifications were unnecessary. The respondents also asserted that their due process was violated, as their detentions were prolonged and they had not been granted merits hearings. The respondents also noted that the stigma of being labeled as a sexually dangerous person is a “lifelong burden.”

The district court agreed with the respondents that the conditions of supervised release meant that § 4248 did not apply to them. Rather, the court held that the government should have proceeded under a different statute, U.S.C.S. § 4241 (2013). This statute provides for commitment of defendants who are impaired in their ability “to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against [them] or to assist properly in [their] defense” (§ 4241(a)). The district court held that “when a respondent has not completed his sentence because he has a remaining term of supervised release, the use of § 4241 is the proper way to initiate [civil commitment] proceedings under the Adam Walsh Act” (Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 682). Essentially, the district court was proposing that the government should first release the prisoner from custody, then obtain a commitment order under § 4241, and subsequently seek a separate civil commitment order for persons committed to the custody of the attorney general who meet the criteria for certification under § 4248(a). The district court also held that continuing to hold the prisoners in custody would raise concerns about potential violations to their due process rights.

The district court ordered that the respondents be released from custody within 30 days (by November 28, 2010). The government hastily appealed and, pending appeal, sought a stay of the respondents' releases from custody. However, the district court denied the government's stay request on November 22, 2010. In response, the government requested an emergency stay. On November 26, 2010, the government's stay request was granted, and the respondents remained in the custody of the BOP.

Ruling and Reasoning

Judge King wrote the opinion, with Judges Gregory and Wynn joining. The court of appeals held that proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 4248 is the proper way for the government to pursue the civil commitment of an allegedly sexually dangerous person who is in the custody of the BOP. The court elaborated that, even when the defendant is serving a prison sentence that includes a period of supervised release, § 4248 remains as the appropriate statute to be applied. It held that § 4248 distinctly indicates that persons in the custody of the BOP can be certified as sexually dangerous persons, without exceptions made for prisoners whose sentences include conditions of supervised release. It noted that “a prisoner in BOP custody whose unexpired sentence includes a term of supervised release is no less in the custody of the BOP than another prisoner who does not face a term of supervised release” (Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 684). The appeals court went on to highlight that 95 percent of individuals serve sentences that include terms of supervised release.

The appeals court further held that a civil commitment under § 4241 was not the proper first step to be pursued in a § 4248 commitment proceeding. They reasoned that there are fundamentally different purposes between these two sections. In fact, the contrast between § 4241 and § 4248 constitutes the “proverbial horse of a different color” (Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 686). Specifically, § 4241, which was first enacted in 1948, addresses the mental competency of a pretrial criminal defendant. There were no claims or evidence that any of the nine respondents were “unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against [them] or to assist properly in [their] defense” (§ 4241(a)). Accordingly, civil commitment under § 4241 was deemed not to be a proper first step in § 4248 commitment proceedings that focus on certification of sexual dangerousness, not competence to stand trial. The district court's order was vacated, and the case remanded for a hearing on sexual dangerousness.

The respondents also asserted that their due process was violated, given that they had been held for many years, without a hearing. However, because the district court failed to raise the question of a potential violation of due process, the majority did not address the question on appeal. However, in a separate concurring opinion, Judge Wynn raised concerns related to the due process rights of the respondents, noting that several courts have held that the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution afford an individual a “final determination as to the validity of his confinement within a reasonable period of time” (Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 687). Judge Wynn commented on the disconcerting reality that respondents have been detained, for years in some cases, without justification of their detention subsequent to their § 4248 certifications. As referenced in In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971), in terms of emergency involuntary commitment, “where a person, said to be mentally ill and dangerous, is involuntarily detained, he must be given a hearing within a reasonable time to test whether the confinement is based upon probable cause.” (Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 687–688) Similarly, Judge Wynn referenced Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905, 910 (D. N.J. 1976), noting that in the context of civil commitment, “a hearing held within a reasonable time after confinement begins is an acceptable means of supplying requisite due process” (Broncheau, 645 F.3d at 688).