Guilty but Mentally Ill, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, and Habeas Corpus

Facts of the Case

In 2008, Mr. Anthony Velazquez was charged with multiple counts arising from two separate incidents. The first incident involved three events. First, he entered a home, where he had a physical altercation with his lover and another person living in the home. Second, during his preliminary hearing, he threatened that lover to prevent her from testifying against him. Third, he wrote that lover several threatening letters from prison. The second incident arose from scratches incurred by a corrections officer while seeking to restrain and place Mr. Velazquez into a cell. Because of these incidents, Mr. Velazquez was charged with burglary, witness intimidation, terroristic threats, and harassment for the circumstances pertaining to his lover, and aggravated assault for injuring the corrections officer.

Mr. Velazquez's defense counsel advised him to plead GBMI, considering that Mr. Velazquez had experienced mental illness. Under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 314(b) (2008), there are three requirements for a GBMI plea to be accepted in Pennsylvania: the judge must examine “all reports prepared pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure,” the judge must hold a hearing solely on the topic “of the defendant's mental illness at which either party may present evidence,” and the judge must be “satisfied that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense” (Velazquez, p 154).

If the GBMI plea is accepted, then the defendant may be sentenced in accordance with the offense as would occur with other general offenders. A second hearing must then be held to determine whether the defendant is severely mentally disabled. If so, then the defendant must also be provided mental health treatment pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9727(b) (2008). If the plea is not accepted, then the defendant may withdraw it and demand a jury trial.

Against this statutory context, Mr. Velazquez pled GBMI, forfeiting his right to trial. Instead of following the statutory framework, however, the judge entered a plea of guilty and postponed resolving the question of mental illness. Defense counsel did not object and agreed that Mr. Velazquez was pleading guilty and that there might be a hearing on GBMI at the time of sentencing. The state indicated that it would only request a hearing to determine whether he would be sent to a psychiatric hospital or a carceral setting.

Subsequently, defense counsel neither obtained Mr. Velazquez's mental health records nor sought mental health examinations. No mental health hearing was held. His plea was recorded as a straight guilty plea, to which defense counsel did not object. He was sentenced with neither a trial nor the opportunity to request one.

On direct appeal, defense counsel asserted that Mr. Velazquez had entered a GBMI plea and made no further arguments of additional requirements, and that it had been accepted. Consequently, the trial court's decision was upheld by the Pennsylvania Superior Court (i.e., Pennsylvania's intermediate criminal appellate court). No error was found in defense counsel's performance at that time.

After exhausting the direct appeal process, Mr. Velazquez petitioned pro se for post-conviction relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-46 (1982). In his petition, he asserted that no hearing was held regarding his mental health and his defense counsel was ineffective.

The state-appointed PCRA counsel issued a no-merit letter, which is a request to withdraw from a case on the basis of a meritless petition. In its letter, PCRA counsel agreed that Mr. Velazquez should have been afforded a mental health hearing before being sentenced, but that this was ultimately unnecessary because the state did not challenge his GBMI status. Hence, PCRA counsel asserted that Mr. Velazquez was not prejudiced. Mr. Velazquez's petition was dismissed by the PCRA court, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed.

Mr. Velazquez sought relief through the federal district court, which rejected the claim because his GBMI plea was not challenged by the state and was accepted by the trial court. He then appealed to the Third Circuit via habeas jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996) nearly 10 years after his conviction.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing the case de novo, ruled both that Mr. Velazquez received ineffective counsel from his trial court attorney and was prejudiced by this. The district court's order was vacated, and the case was remanded with instructions to grant Mr. Velazquez's petition and to vacate his conviction.

In rendering its decision, the Third Circuit determined that the guilty plea entered by the trial court was invalid. The process used by the trial court did not adhere to the process set forth by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 314(b). By not adhering to the statute, the trial court denied Mr. Velazquez the process for determining both whether he was mentally ill at the time of his offense and whether he was severely mentally ill and required treatment.

Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), the Third Circuit determined that the proper remedy was not merely to alter Mr. Velazquez's sentence to reflect what treatment he would have received had the GBMI plea been entered correctly, but instead to provide him with his lost opportunity, i.e., the process set forth by Pennsylvania statute. Specifically, he must receive a hearing to determine whether he was mentally ill at the time of his offense and, if so, receive a hearing to determine whether he is severely mentally disabled, requiring mental health treatment. If determined not to be mentally ill, then he would have the right to demand a jury trial. Simply adjusting his sentence would not provide him with his statutorily mandated hearings and would deny him the opportunity to demand a jury trial if it were determined that he was not mentally ill at the time of his offense. To allow these opportunities it was necessary to vacate his conviction.

The trial court's failure to conduct the proper hearings resulted from defense counsel's failure to object to the court's procedure for addressing Mr. Velazquez's GBMI claim. This failure was compounded by defense counsel's failure to raise the proper claim on direct appeal. Subsequently, PCRA counsel incorrectly stated that the plea had been accepted, resulting in both the PCRA and the superior court's inaccurate understanding of the nature of Mr. Velazquez's claim and consequent failure to rule based on what would have been a correct and factual understanding of the claims. The court determined that defense counsel was ineffective because “counsel was ignorant of the GBMI-plea procedures prescribed by Pennsylvania law” and “failed to assure that this procedure was followed and failed to verify that the plea documents reflected the plea his client sought to enter” (Velazquez, p 161, relying on Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014)). Consequently, Mr. Velazquez was prevented from taking advantage of the statutory GBMI process.