Mental Health Mitigation Evidence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Facts of the Case

David Runyon shot and killed Cory Voss as part of a murder-for-hire conspiracy with Mr. Voss's wife, Catherina Voss, and her lover, Michael Draven. Mrs. Voss and Mr. Draven had decided to murder Mr. Voss to collect his Navy death benefits, including a $400,000 life insurance policy payout. They hired Mr. Runyon to commit the murder. On the night of April 29, 2007, Mrs. Voss sent Mr. Voss to the bank to withdraw money from an account she had recently opened. While Mr. Voss was at the ATM, Mr. Runyon, who was waiting in hiding, got into Mr. Voss's truck. The next morning, Mr. Voss was found dead in his truck near the bank.

The police eventually arrested and charged Mr. Runyon, Mrs. Voss, and Mr. Draven. Mrs. Voss and Mr. Draven received sentences of life imprisonment. As for Mr. Runyon, a federal jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder for hire, carjacking resulting in death, and murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. Because Mr. Runyon had a history of head trauma, his lawyer engaged several experts, including a neuropsychologist and a neuropsychiatrist, in preparation for the penalty phase of trial. These experts examined Mr. Runyon, ordered brain imaging, and offered opinions that Mr. Runyon had impaired executive functioning, had a neurological disorder, and required further testing. During the penalty phase, however, Mr. Runyon's lawyer did not investigate these matters further or present any mitigation evidence of a neurocognitive disorder. The jury, after weighing other mitigating and aggravating factors, recommended the death penalty, which the district court imposed.

In 2015, after exhausting the appeals process, Mr. Runyon filed a habeas corpus motion claiming eighteen grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Runyon presented evidence from four experts, collectively stating that his head trauma had resulted in impaired executive functioning, posttraumatic stress disorder, and psychosis. In addition, Mr. Runyon presented evidence from his former lawyer, who stated that he should have continued the investigation into Mr. Runyon's mental health history and that the expert evidence in the habeas motion would have been useful during the penalty phase of trial. The district court denied the habeas motion on all claims. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to hear argument on four of Mr. Runyon's claims.

Ruling and Reasoning

The three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit produced three different opinions in this case. The majority opinion by Judge Niemeyer is controlling because one of the other two judges agreed with its ruling on each of the four claims that the court considered. The relevant claim here was whether Mr. Runyon's lawyer provided ineffective assistance when he failed to investigate fully Mr. Runyon's brain injury and mental illness and failed to introduce this evidence in mitigation during the penalty phase of trial. The Fourth Circuit held that this claim was plausible, but that the existing record did not support a conclusion in either direction. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's denial of the claim and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to resolve the facts in dispute.

The Fourth Circuit relied on the two-part test of ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In the first part of the test, the court considered whether the performance of Mr. Runyon's lawyer was “deficient.” Here, the court noted that “our focus is on ‘whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce' particular mitigating evidence ‘was itself reasonable’” (Runyon, p 731, quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), p 523 (emphasis in original)). The court considered the evidence available to Mr. Runyon's lawyer at the time of trial. This included reports from experts stating that Mr. Runyon likely had neurological damage resulting in impaired functioning and delusions. The experts also had recommended further evaluation of Mr. Runyon. The court concluded that “these red flags clearly pointed to potential mitigating evidence” (Runyon, p 732). The court also considered the decision not to use this potential mitigating evidence. Mr. Runyon's lawyer had stated that he did not remember the reason he had not introduced the evidence and that the mental health evidence uncovered later during further investigation would have been useful. The court concluded that it was unclear whether not using the evidence was a “strategic,” and thus reasonable, decision.

In the second part of the Strickland test, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the potentially deficient performance of Mr. Runyon's lawyer “prejudiced the defense,” in the sense that the result would have been different if he had introduced the mitigating evidence in question. The court concluded that, again, the matter was unclear. In sum, the Fourth Circuit ruled that there should have been further inquiry into whether Mr. Runyon received ineffective assistance of counsel and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to make that determination.

Dissent

In his dissent, Judge Wilkinson concluded that the district court rightly denied Mr. Runyon's ineffective claim. He argued that the two Strickland requirements are “high bars” and that the majority opinion “flouts Strickland” by interpreting it too liberally. In this case, Mr. Runyon's lawyer made an “eminently reasonable” decision not to use mental health mitigation evidence and instead introduced fourteen other mitigating factors. Because the lawyer's decision was a “strategic” one, there was a “strong presumption” that it was adequate.