Adjudicated NGRI on One Charge and Guilty on Another

Facts of the Case

Larry Lee Williams attacked his wife on July 8, 2014, and, again, on August 24, 2014. Mr. Williams had three prior convictions for assault. On September 2, 2014, he pleaded guilty to felony assault and battery, third or subsequent offense, for the July offense. Following the discovery of recordings of jail phone calls in which he stated that he could not recall the August offense due to a blackout, a forensic evaluation was ordered. A psychologist determined that Mr. Williams was competent to stand trial on all charges. At a May 18, 2015, plea hearing for the August offense, the Commonwealth announced that a plea deal had been reached: Mr. Williams would accept responsibility for the July offense and the Commonwealth would stipulate to a NGRI plea for the August offense. Mr. Williams stated that he understood the potential consequences of pleading guilty and NGRI. The Circuit Court of the City of Richmond accepted the pleas and ordered Mr. Williams be placed in the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services (DBHDS) for evaluation. He was thus hospitalized at Central State Hospital.

At a November 17, 2015, sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth proposed that Mr. Williams serve five years in prison, the maximum sentence, for the July offense, followed by commitment for the August offense. The defense requested that he be committed immediately, citing psychiatric and neuropsychological reports recommending mental health treatment. The circuit court agreed to the sequence proposed by the Commonwealth. Mr. Williams was sentenced to a five-year prison term preceding NGRI commitment. Mr. Williams appealed.

Ruling and Reasoning

The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court requiring Mr. Williams to serve time in prison and then be committed.

Mr. Williams' appeal was based on the grounds that the circuit court had violated due process rights by removing a person with mental illness from a hospital and sending him to prison without “time served” credit from hospitalization. While the alleged error was unpreserved (i.e., was not objected to in a lower court), the defense argued that an appellate court should review the case under the “ends of justice” exception. Rule 5:25 states that appellate courts can consider arguments as a basis for reversal, even if there was not a contemporaneous objection made in the lower court, when it would enable the court to attain the ends of justice. The defense contended that to not apply the ends of justice exception would result in a “grave injustice” (Commonwealth v. Bass, 292 Va. 19, 27 (2016)) because the circuit court had ignored the seriousness of Mr. Williams' mental illness. The defense concluded that he required treatment, not punishment.

The Virginia Supreme Court noted that Mr. Williams conceded not objecting in the circuit court and, therefore, objections were not preserved for review. The Supreme Court, therefore, could not consider those arguments as a basis for reversal except to attain the ends of justice. The court cited Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 689 (2010), which ruled that the ends of justice exception should be applied “in very limited circumstances,” such as when the record established that an element of a crime did not actually occur. The court argued that sentence sequencing did not result in a grave injustice as there was due process involving a hearing in which the defendant had counsel, could present evidence, and could be heard. Mr. Williams, as a competent defendant, had pleaded guilty to the July offense, which occurred before his temporary insanity. Mr. Williams never objected to the prison sentence but had merely objected to the sequencing, for which the court argued there was no statutory direction. Furthermore, the court noted that the Department of Corrections would be required by Virginia statute (Code § 53.1-32[A] (2012)) and case law (Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, (1976)) to provide mental health treatment to Mr. Williams during his prison sentence. The court contended that Mr. Williams could be transferred to an outside facility, should the need arise. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no manifest injustice with regard to delaying the commitment of a person with mental illness to a psychiatric hospital in favor of serving a prison sentence.

Dissent

In dissent, Justice J. Powell argued that it was a grave injustice to require Mr. Williams to be incarcerated before being committed. He noted that Virginia statute (Code § 19.2-182.2 (2012)) stated that NGRI acquittees “shall” be placed in the custody of DBHDS. Justice Powell argued that, because Mr. Williams was incarcerated after the sentencing hearing, the mandates of the NGRI commitment statute were not followed. Meanwhile, the court did not use its discretion to “suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the sentence in whole or part” (Code § 19.2-303 (2011)), even though the code for felony assault and battery, third or subsequent offense (Code § 18.2-10[f] (2017)), allowed for discretionary sentencing up to five years. Because the NGRI disposition was mandatory, but the criminal sentencing was discretionary, Justice Powell argued that the circuit court erred and abused its discretion. Therefore, Justice Powell concluded that the ends of justice exception applied and should have resulted in reversal.

Concurrence

In concurrence, Justice J. Mims explicitly agreed with Justice Powell's argument that statutory law (Code § 19.2-182.2 (2012)) required NGRI acquittees to be committed, but argued that the circuit court had complied with the law because it had placed Mr. Williams in DBHDS custody for evaluation immediately after accepting his NGRI plea.

Justice Mims reluctantly agreed with the majority's ruling regarding the ends of justice exception. However, he lamented the inadequate statutory direction regarding the prioritization of incarceration and NGRI commitment, and he urged state legislative action. He further noted that medical care is the principal function of hospitals, while it is only an incidental function of prisons.